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INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2007, Bolivia informed the World Bank of its decision
to denounce the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Conven-
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tion).! On July 9, 2009, Ecuador followed suit. 2 Both Bolivia and
Ecuador sought to divest the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an investor-state dispute resolution forum, of jurisdiction to decide disputes involving them.
Bolivia and Ecuador are the only states to denounce the ICSID
Convention, but their denunciation comes at a time of much
debate about ICSID's "legitimacy."3 Attempting to avert a "legitimacy crisis," often without defining the term and assuming a common definition exists, various individuals have proposed a myriad
of reforms, ranging from creating an appellate body to influencing
the direction of ICSID's jurisprudence to rooting out perceived
institutional bias. 4
The lack of theoretical precision in discussing ICSID's legitimacy
is not surprising. Scholars have not directly addressed the question
of what makes an international adjudicative body legitimate.
Although various authors have discussed the legitimacy of
nonadjudicative international institutions, U.S. courts (particularly

1. See Letter Denouncing the ICSID Convention from David Choquehuanca Cespedes, Foreign Affairs Minister, Republic of Bolivia, to Paul Wolfowitz, President, World
Bank (May 1, 2007), reprinted in 46 LL.M. 973 (2007) [hereinafter Bolivia Denunciation of
ICSID Convention]; see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
2. See "Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention," ICSID
News Release (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.woridbank.org/icsid/FrontServlet?
requestType=casesRH&actionval=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&From
Page=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20.
3. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521
(2005); William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and
the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'y 199 (2008);
Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World,
8 SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ. 345 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 3, at 1524 (suggesting the creation of an "independent,
permanent appellate body with the authority to review awards rendered under a variety of
investment treaties" as a manner of enhancing legitimacy); id. at 1587-1610 (surveying a
number of different suggestions for reform to investment arbitration tribunals to promote
legitimacy); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 373 (2008) ("Operationalizing the margin
of appreciation of investment arbitration would help preserve the legitimacy of ICSID
panels by defining their supervisory function, while preserving the primary responsibility of
states to develop policy responses within their legal obligations in extreme situations.").
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the U.S. Supreme Court) ,5 and international legal rules,6 the literature lacks a systematic attempt to unpack this concept specifically
for international adjudicative bodies. 7
Attempting to define, identify, and analyze legitimacy challenges
that international courts and tribunals face is useful to those seeking to expose and remedy their flaws and deepens our understanding of how these institutions should function. Perceptions of
legitimacy may protect an institution from abolishment or fundamental alterations of its role. s Actors within the international system-individuals, states, or nongovernmental organizations-may
wish to preserve the legitimacy of a particular institution because
they are committed to the substantive norms or legal regime that
the tribunal is charged with interpreting and upholding.
If adjudication is preferable to available alternatives, understanding what makes a court or tribunal legitimate becomes essential.
The increasing delegation of international dispute settlement to
adjudicative bodies, or the increasing 'Judicialization" of the international system, seems to indicate a preference for resolving disputes in the courtroom rather than on the battlefield or at the
negotiating table. 9 Although international actors and scholars
5. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L.
REv. 379 (1983); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV.
1787, 1790 (2005) (pointing out that, even in the context of U.S. constitutional debate,
"[tJhose who appeal to legitimacy frequently fail to explain what they mean or the criteria
that they employ"); James L. Gibson, Understandings ofjustice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAw & SOC'y REv. 469, 470 (1989) (noting the existence of "scholarly folklore" in the United States domestic context that the "special ability"
of the United States Supreme Court "to legitimize government policies and actions" is
"crucial to the political system because legitimacy engenders voluntary compliance with law
by citizens").
6. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990)
(focusing primarily on international rules but referencing international institutions in his
definition of legitimacy); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273, 290 (1997) (measuring the "effectiveness of a supranational tribunal in terms of its ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic government institutions, directly and through pressure from
private litigants, to use their power on its behalf').
7. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 596 n.3, 600 (1999) (noting that
"[wJork on the emerging problem of international legitimacy is only just beginning" and
that there are "relatively few discussions of legitimacy by international lawyers").
8. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational
Legallnstitutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court ofjustice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459,
460,471 (1995) ("Legitimacy is institutional support (diffuse support)-willingness to support the continued functioning of the institution despite disagreement with its outputs.").
9. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791.
797-98 & n.18 (2007); see generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider. Not Quite a World Without
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have made progress over the last decade toward developing a theoretical framework on international courts and tribunals, "the
inquiry lacks a broad theoretical foundation,"l0 and "the field is
still in its infancy."}} Developing a common framework for analysis
will allow more fruitful comparative studies of international courts
and tribunals. This Article attempts to contribute to the scholarly
discussion surrounding international adjudicative bodies by using
legitimacy as an organizing principle.
This Article proposes a theory of legitimacy tailored to international courts and tribunals. Part II begins by defining an "international adjudicative body" as a dispute resolution mechanism-also
called a court or tribunal-that decides disputes between litigants,
at least one of whom is a state. The analysis is limited only to adjudicative bodies where states are involved as litigants because a different set of legitimacy-influencing factors may be present when
only private parties are involved. Part II then lays out a theory of
legitimacy specifically for international adjudicative bodies and distinguishes it from prior theoretical approaches, particularly those
reliant on "legal legitimacy" alone. Borrowing in part from Daniel
Bodansky and others, the Article defines a legitimate international
adjudicative body as one whose authority is perceived asjustified. 12
Part II identifies the three factors that influence perceptions of
justified authority, while Part III discusses them in depth. The factors are the fair and unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, commitment to the underlying normative regime that the body is
interpreting and applying, and the body's transparency and relationship with other democratic values. These three legitimacyinfluencing factors are deduced or drawn from state practice as
embodied in treaty provisions giving rise to or regulating six international adjudicative bodies, as well as legal and political-science
literature on legitimacy, and logic. The purpose of this paper is
not to provide empirical support for these hypotheses, but rather
to propose a framework for thinking about legitimacy for future
debate and possible empirical testing. Part IV briefly concludes the
Article.
Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. REsoL. 119
(2006) (discussing the increasingjudicialization of international public disputes).
10. David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 401 (2006).
11. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429,
432 (2003).
12. See Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600.

2009]

Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies

II.
A.

DEFINING

111

KEY TERMS

International Adjudicative Bodies

For the purposes of this Article, an "international adjudicative
body" is a dispute resolution mechanism that decides disputes
between litigants, at least one of whom is a state. Although international adjudicative bodies traditionally decided disputes between
states only, today individuals and corporations also participate as
litigants. I3 This Article focuses specifically on courts and tribunals
deciding disputes involving at least one state because different
legitimacy-influencing factors come into play when only private
parties are involved. For example, while closed and confidential
proceedings may enhance legitimacy in a dispute involving only
private actors, they may detract from legitimacy when states are
involved. 14
Like domestic dispute resolution fora, international ones may
have a number of different functions. I5 For the purposes of this
Article, however, they have one primary function-resolving disputes pending before them. Specifically, they must find facts, identify and interpret relevant legal rules or "law," use secondary
principles to fill legal gaps and ambiguities, and apply the relevant
law to the facts at hand for the purposes of issuing a ruling. I6
13. For example, individuals and, in some cases, corporations have standing to raise
claims against states in various international fora. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 1,
art. 25 (extending the Centre's jurisdiction "to any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State ... and a national of another Contracting State");
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, Mar. 25,1957,2002 OJ. (C 325) 33
[hereinafter EC Treaty] (stating that, in specific circumstances, "[a]ny natural or legal
person may ... institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against
a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former").
14. See Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 121, 134-38 (2003) (discussing confidentiality in
the public and private arbitration contexts).
15. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 282 (asserting that, in the domestic context, a court's functions may include "dispute resolution, 'social control,' lawmaking, articulating social and political ideas, protecting individual and minority rights, and securing
social change"); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 380
(1978) ("[A]djudication is a form of social ordering institutionally committed to 'rational'
decision."); Caron, supra note 10, at 405-06 (suggesting that our understanding of the functions of and justifications for international courts and tribunals is enriched by political
theory of domestic courts, as well as international relations theory).
16. V.S. Mani adopts a similar "operational" approach to international adjudicative
bodies, describing their role "in conflict resolution ... as principally three-fold. In the first
place, it performs a relatively impartial fact-finding function in assessing and appreciating
the evidential bases of the controverted claims. Second, it finds and expounds the relevant
juridical norms in the context of the particular controversy before it. And finally, it
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The decision makers serving on these bodies are adjudicatorsoften called judges or arbitrators-designated to hear and decide
the disputes. Litigants may appoint adjudicators at the time a particular case arises, or parties to the treaty giving rise to the tribunal
may elect the adjudicators. For example, the International Court
of Justice's Statute (ICJ Statute) specifies that fifteen judges are
elected by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council for
nine-year terms.J7 Ad hoc judges may be appointed by a state
before the Court if there is no judge of that state's nationality on
the bench.l 8 Under ICSID's procedures, litigants appoint their
arbitrators when litigation begins, and if the parties do not agree
on the composition of the tribunal, ICSID's Chairman may designate individuals to serve on it. 19
International adjudicative bodies are established either by treaty
or by parties on an ad hoc basis. A treaty establishing a dispute
resolution body, often called the body's "statute," usually specifies
its functions, designates the law it may apply, and mandates specific
procedures. For example, the ICJ Statute specifies that the ICJ
must apply international conventions establishing rules expressly
recognized by contesting states, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and 'judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists."20 The
ICJ Statute also delineates the circumstances under which the ICJ
has power to hear a dispute between states. 21 International adjudicative bodies may also be limited to interpreting and applying law
within a particular substantive area. For example, the jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) comprises
"all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions" of the American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of
San Jose, so long as state parties have recognized such jurisdicendeavours to resolve the dispute-or at least disposes it off from the juridical plane-by
applying those norms to the facts and circumstances of the case." V.S. MAN I, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL AsPECTS 1 (1980).
17. Statute of the International Court ofJustice arts. 3(1), 4(1), 13(1),June 26,1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
18. Id. art. 31.
19. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, arts. 37-38. ICSID maintains a "Panel of Arbitrators" consisting of a list of individuals named by states and by the ICSID Chairman as
possible arbitrators, but at the time a specific tribunal is designated, states are not required
to draw from the Panel. Id. arts. 12-13,40. Nonetheless, the Chairman must draw from the
Panel when he or she is called upon to constitute a tribunal. Id. arts. 38, 40; see also tbl. 2
infra Part III.A.2.i.
20. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 38.
21. See id. art. 36.
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tion. 22 David Caron calls these tribunals "community-originated
institution[s] ... created by a group of states to resolve disputes of
concern to that community," and they mayor may not be used by
members of the originating community.23
To establish ad hoc adjudicative bodies, parties usually prepare a
compromis or agreement to arbitrate that lays out how the arbitration will take place, who the arbitrators will be, what the tribunal
must decide, and which law it should apply. The compromis may
even stipulate the facts upon which the tribunal should rely in
deciding the dispute. 24 Caron labels ad hoc adjudicative bodies as
"party-originated dispute resolution institution[s]," created by two
parties to resolve a dispute between them, and before which only
those two parties will be heard. 25
A third group of tribunals is a hybrid of traditional treaty and ad
hoc tribunals. What might be called "administrative" treaties establish mechanisms to facilitate the creation and function of ad hoc
arbitral panels in a particular substantive area. For example, the
ICSID Convention establishes a secretariat and methodology for
choosing arbitrators, contemplates the creation of uniform procedural rules, and provides administrative support for disputes
involving investors and states under bilateral investment treaties. 26
Tribunals that hear cases under the auspices of ICSID dissolve
once the dispute between the litigating parties is decided. 27 The
World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Resolution Body's
22. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 62,
Nov. 22, 1969, OAS.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention].
23. Caron, supra note 10, at 404.
24. For example, during the 20th Century, countries disputing territorial or maritime
boundaries, especially in Latin America, prepared compromises establishing questions for
resolution, and often, rules and procedures for ad hoc arbitrations. See, e.g., Protocol of
Arbitration with Supplementary Act, Chile-Peru, arts. 1-2, July 20, 1922, 21 L.N.T.S. 141
(establishing which questions remained outstanding under an 1883 peace treaty for possible resolution by arbitration by the United States President); Arbitration Agreement, July
22, 1971, 21 R.I.AA 53, 64 (U.K.-Arg.-Chile 1977), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement, u.K.-Arg.-Chile]
(designating arbitrators, and establishing questions to be addressed, and procedures for
arbitration) .
25. Caron, supra note 10, at 403-04.
26. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., arts. 1-3, 6, 12-16.
27. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES 99, 12426 (Rules 50-52) (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basic
doc/CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules). ICSID ad hoc tribunals
may be reconstituted after the rendering of an award, supplementary decision, or rectification, if the parties request interpretation or revision of the award and if each member of
the original tribunal is willing to take part in these further proceedings. See id.
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panel system functions in a similar manner-panels are formed to
hear specific disputes, and the WTO Secretariat provides administrative support. 28 These tribunals exist within a superstructure,
both in terms of procedure and substantive law. They cross-fertilize each other in ways that regular "party-originated dispute resolution institutions" with no substantive or procedural linkages do
not, yet they are not "treaty tribunals" or "community-originated
institutions" either, as they are generated by an administrative
treaty and governed by treaties between the litigating parties. 29
This Article's definition of "international adjudicative body"
includes what Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter call a
"supranational" adjudicative body-a tribunal "established by a
group of states or the entire international community and that
exercises jurisdiction over cases directly involving private parties"30
as well as state-to-state litigation. This definition does not include
national courts that may exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving sovereign states and private litigants. Although these courts
may playa significant role in the "international judicial system,"31
offer interpretations of international treaties that are binding in
national courts, and influence decisions of other domestic and
international tribunals, they lie outside the scope of this Article
because they are subject to a different set of structural and legal
constraints. For example, their membership is made up of judges
who are all of the same nationality, their decisions are habitually
analyzed in light of domestic law and politics, and they usually have
enforcement mechanisms.
This Article's definition of "international adjudicative body"
does not require that the parties bind themselves a priori to a court
or tribunal's rulings. Traditionally, states indicate in the treaty or
compromis giving rise to a tribunal whether they will consider the
tribunal's ruling binding. 32 Such a commitment on the part of a
state does not, however, determine whether a court or arbitral
panel is an "international tribunal" as defined here. Rather, the
28. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 1, 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
29. See generally CHITrHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 2-3 (2009) (commenting on the "uniqueness" of ICSID and WTO
tribunals) .
30. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 289_
31. See Martinez, supra note 11, at 436_
32. See, e.g., Arbitration Agreement, U.K-Arg.-Chile, supra note 24, art_ 14, at 70 ("The
award shall be legally binding upon both the Parties ___ .")_ Nonetheless, Argentina repudiated the award.
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characteristics described above-at least one state participant, a
treaty or compromis giving rise to the dispute resolution mechanism,
membership, and functions-determine whether an institution is
an international adjudicative body. This Article's analysis of legitimacy focuses on international civil tribunals, not criminal ones.
While many of the same factors may influence legitimacy of these
tribunals, a close analysis of similarities and differences lies beyond
the scope of this Article.
B.

Legitimacy

At the highest level of abstraction, this Article proposes that a
"legitimate" international adjudicative body is one whose authority is
perceived as justified. A legitimate international court or tribunal
must possess some "quality that leads people (or states) to accept
[its] authority ... because of a general sense that the authority is
justified."33 Like other theories of legitimacy, this one "attempt[s]
to specify what factors might serve as justifications."34 This Article
proposes that an international court is legitimate when it is (1) fair
and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with
what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and
infused with democratic norms.
This understanding of legitimacy of international adjudicative
bodies goes beyond legal legitimacy. It is most similar to sociological legitimacy, and may include components of moral legitimacy.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. usefully distinguishes between these three
kinds of legitimacy in the context of U.S. constitutional debates,35
and they are helpful in the international context as well. While
33. Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600. Bodansky's article is not focused on international
courts, but rather on the concept of legitimacy generally, and its specific applicability in
the international environmental law realm. Nonetheless, his discussion of authority is
applicable and useful in this context.
34. [d. at 601; accord id. at 612 (stating that authority may be legitimated by its origin
or source, by "procedures considered to be fair,» or by the production of "desired outcomes"); Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1992) (reviewing
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)) (proposing that
legitimacy must also take account of "available notions of authentic human justice"); Jose
E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of Legitimacy Among
Nations by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.V. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199, 200-09 (1991) (reviewing
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)) (discussing a
number of different approaches to defining legitimacy); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in
EFFICIENCY, EQUrIY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 265 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (positing that the extent to which democratic values are reflected in an institution's inputs and outputs determines legitimacy).
35. See Fallon, supra note 5, at 1794-1801.
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legal legitimacy relies on a reasonable or "correct" interpretation
as a matter of law, moral legitimacy "is a function of moral justifiability or respect-worthiness."36 Sociological legitimacy rests on the
belief that "particular claims to authority deserve respect or obedience for reasons not restricted to self-interest" and traces to Max
Weber. 37
An international adjudicative body attains legal legitimacy when
a state consents to utilize it for adjudication of a dispute or set of
disputes, and the body limits its actions to that mandate. 38 A state
may express its consent by ratification of a treaty or compromis
designating a particular adjudicative forum, or by agreeing to join
a confederation or community of states that requires adjudication
by a particular tribunal in case of dispute as a condition of admission. The test for legal legitimacy is whether a court acted ultra
vires or within its jurisdictional limits. Legal legitimacy explains
neither why a state perceives a court as possessing justified authority (resulting in consent) nor why it continues to do so over time.
The legal legitimacy approach denies legitimacy's "agent-relative"39 nature. As various international relations scholars recognize, states are neither the sole actors in the international realm
nor unitary actors, and their preferences may be shaped by a number of constituencies. 40 These constituencies may include domestic political parties, voters, elites, domestic and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private parties. The
decision to grant continuing consent depends on the perceptions
of any given actor who might influence or determine state preferences. Consequently, the views of these various actors are relevant
to legitimacy to the extent they are reflected in state preferences.
Alternatively stated, state preferences, views, or beliefs are a proxy
for the preferences of those who set or influence state policy.
Legitimacy is agent-relative because different actors may have different perceptions-while some may believe an adjudicative body
is legitimate, others might disagree.
36. [d. at 1794-96.
37. [d. at 1795.
38. See Bodansky, supra note 7, at 605 ("Legal legitimacy is what connects an institution's continuing authority to its original basis in state consent. The authority of the International Court of Justice, for example, derives from its Statute, to which UN member states
consented. And the Court's continuing authority depends on its acting in accordance with
the Statute. If it went outside or against the Statute, then its actions would lack
legitimacy.").
39. I thank Professor Richard Fallon for this terminology.
40. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 192-93
(1996).
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The legal legitimacy approach also ignores the dynamic nature
of legitimacy. Perceptions of legitimacy may change over time.
Actors may alter their views on a court's legitimacy, before or when
litigation is commenced, during dispute resolution, or after it
issues a decision. Events subsequent to the granting of consentparticularly if a state consented in a treaty ratified many years
before a concrete case arose-may affect perceptions of legitimacy.
A state may even decide to withdraw its consent to adjudication by
a tribunal. For example, the United States withdrew its consent to
the lC]'s compulsory jurisdiction following an adverse decision in
the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),41 and Bolivia withdrew its
consent to adjudication through lCSlD in May 2007. 42 Legallegitimacy does not explain the decision to withdraw or continue to consent to adjudication in a particular forum.
This Article's approach to legitimacy is more akin to the sociological legitimacy of Max Weber and Thomas Franck, although the
inquiry is different. Sociological legitimacy looks to whether "the
relevant public regards" a regime, institution, or decision as 'Justified," that is, whether "particular claims to authority deserve
respect or obedience for reasons not restricted to self-interest."43
Accordingly, Weber and Franck ask what draws citizens and states,
respectively, to comply with law. Although Weber's focus is on
legitimacy in the domestic context, his influence on subsequent
scholarship calls for an examination of his perspective. 44 Franck's
41. See Department Statement, u.s. Dep't of State, US Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice Gan. 18, 1985), in DEP'T
ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64, and in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S.
Sec'y of State, to Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Sec'y-General (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (terminating the United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
42. See Bolivia Denunciation of ICSID Convention, supra note l.
43. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1795; accord Bodansky, supra note 7, at 60l.
44. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 5, at 380-82 (asserting that the most commonly-encountered definitions of legitimacy rely on a belief in a binding or obligatory quality and discussing Max Weber's conception of the term). Weber writes that "the concept of law will
be defined as an order which depends upon an enforcement staff." MAX WEBER ON LAw IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIE"IY 6 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Reinstein trans., 1967).
He notes:
Time and again international law has been said not to be 'law,' because it lacks a
supra-national enforcement agency. Indeed, our definition of law, too, would not
apply to an order which is guaranteed merely by the expectation of disapproval
and reprisals on the part of those who are harmed by its violation, i.e., merely by
convention and self-interest rather than by a staff of persons whose conduct is
specially oriented toward the observation of the regulatory order.
!d.
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book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations is arguably among the
most important relatively recent contributions to legitimacy theory
in the international context. 45 Weber seeks to determine what
causes individuals to conform their behavior to a "legitimate
order."46 The question posed in Franck's book is: "Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?"47 This Article queries what circumstances influence the many different actors who shape state
preferences to perceive a court or tribunal's authority as justified.
What makes states decide to join and stay within a dispute resolution mechanism? This is a different question from what causes
states to comply with a rule or decision and yields insights useful to
those interested specifically in the establishment and functioning
of international courts and tribunals.
Since the inquiries differ, so too do the answers. Both Weber
and Franck emphasize obligation or compliance with rules or commands in their definitions of legitimacy. For Weber, individuals
conform their conduct to a "legitimate order" when it is "valid"
because it is viewed as "obligatory or exemplary."48 An order may
be considered legitimate based on (1) tradition, (2) "emotional
faith," (3) "value-rational faith," and (4) "positive enactment of recognized legality."49 What is traditionally legitimate is likely to continue to be viewed in the same light. 50 Emotional faith is relevant
when something is "newly revealed" or "exemplary" and might
occur through recognition of a legitimate prophet. 51 Valuerational faith, on the other hand, is "that which has been deduced
as absolutely demanded," and natural law is a prime example. 52
Belief in legality is "the most common form of legitimacy," and
arises either "because the enactment has been agreed upon by all
those who are concerned," or through "imposition by a domina45. Franck's book was widely reviewed. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 34; Koskenniemi,
supra note 34.
46. See MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 3, 8-9. Anthony
Kronman asserts that Weber's sociological inquiry into law is focused on "how the behaviour of individuals is causally influenced by their own normative commitments to the law
and by their beliefs regarding the similar commitments of others . . . ." ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, MAx WEBER 12 (1983).
47. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 3.
48. See MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 3; see also Hyde,
supra note 5, at 380-82 (asserting that the most commonly-encountered definitions oflegitimacy rely on a belief in a binding or obligatory quality and discussing Max Weber's conception of the term).
49. MAx WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 8.
50. See id.
5!. Id.
52. Id. at 8-9.
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tion of human beings over human beings which is treated as legitimate and meets with acquiescence."53 Weber defines
"domination" or "authority" as
the situation in which[] [t]he manifested will (command) of the
ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more
others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way
that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the
ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of
their conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the
other end, this situation will be called obedience. 54

Anthony Kronman paraphrases Weber's understanding of authority as the belief by the dominated in the "normatively binding quality of some principle to which the person exercising power
makes-or may make-appeal."55 The ruler will appeal to principles of legitimation, which include tradition, legal-rational authority, and charisma-three of the four categories of legitimacy
previously identified (tradition, legal rationality, and prophetic revelation, respectively) .56
Franck's definition of legitimacy in the international context has
some similarities to Weber's. First, he too links legitimacy to compliance or obedience. Franck defines legitimacy as "a property of a
rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed
believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process."57 Second, Franck's idea that compliance can be derived
from belief that a rule has come into being and operates as mandated by "generally accepted principles of right process," is similar
to Weber's concept oflegal rationality, in which "the validity of the
rules that fix the limits of legitimate authority depends upon their
form, their status as formally correct enactments, rather than their
specific content."58 Although Franck mentions institutions and
process in his definition of legitimacy and spends some time discussing them, his focus is on the qualities of rules that pull toward
53. Id. Weber also describes "belief in legality" as "acquiescence in enactments which
are formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner." Id. at 9.
54. !d. at 328. Kronman points out that Weber defines authority in a number of different ways, but this definition of "domination" "expresses the essence of Weber's concept
of authority." KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 38.
55. KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 39.
56. See id. at 43-50. Kronman points out that although Weber lists four sources of
legitimacy at one point, he omits "value-rational faith" in subsequent discussion. Id. at 44
n.*; see also MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIE'IY, supra note 44, at 336-37.
57. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasis added).
58. Compare id. at 19, with KRONMAN, supra note 46, at 45 (discussing Weber).
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compliance, not the institutions or processes that promulgate
them. 59
Franck identifies four factors that influence legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence. 6o Determinacy "denotes a rule's clarity of meaning," as well as "the extent to
which the rule's communicative power exerts its own dynamic pull
toward compliance."61 Symbolic validation, ritual, and pedigree
are defined as "the voluntarily acknowledged authenticity of a rule
or a rule-maker, or, sometimes, the authenticity (validity) bestowed
on a symbolic communication's recipient,"62 perhaps similar to
Weber's "traditional authority." Coherence is linked to the consistent application of rules to similar situations63 and "provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to
1) its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to
solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in use to
resolve different problems."64 Finally, adherence is the "vertical
nexus between a primary rule of obligation . . . and a hierarchy of
secondary rules identifying the sources of rules and establishing
normative standards that define how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied."65
Unlike Franck and Weber, this Article focuses specifically on
international adjudicative bodies and what justifies their authority
for actors who set or influence state preferences. What contributes
to perceptions of justified authority differs from what characteristics of a rule pull toward compliance, although perceptions of
authority will likely influence compliance with an international
court's decisions. Weber, too, recognizes that authority underlies
legitimacy, but identifies a limited set of factors that give rise to
authority and obligation in the domestic realm only. Like Weber,
Bodansky looks to 'Justification of authority" in defining legiti59. Franck's second factor, "symbolic validation," addresses process and institutions to
some extent, but again, this is not the focus of his book. Further, he does not delve into
the specifics of what kinds of processes or qualities of institutions provide symbolic validation. See generally FRANCK, supra note 6, at 91-110 (discussing symbolic validation, ritual,
and pedigree).
60. !d. at 49.
61. [d. at 84. Nonetheless, as Franck explains, a rule's clarity is not necessarily an
indicator of its compliance pull, particularly when its clear command produces results "at
variance with common sense." [d. at 68.
62. [d. at 91.
63. See id. at 152-53.
64. [d. at 147-48.
65. [d. at 184. The idea behind adherence is that "a rule is more likely to obligate if it
is made within the framework of an organized normative hierarchy, than if it is merely an
ad hoc agreement between parties in a state of nature." [d.
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macy, and identifies a number of contributing factors, including
origin or source, "procedures considered to be fair," and production of "desired outcomes."66 None of these authors, however,
attempt to identify the specific qualities of international courts that
lead states and other international actors who influence state preferences to perceive a court as legitimate.
This Article proposes that three factors influence perceptions of
justified authority, or legitimacy. The first is the perception that
the tribunal is fair and unbiased-a perception linked to its procedures and decision-makers. This is consistent with the definition of
authority put forth by Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and other
adherents of the New Haven School: "the structure of expectation
concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is
competent to make which decisions by what criteria and what procedures."67 It is also similar to Weber's references to "tradition"
and "legality," Franck's reliance on "symbolic validation," and
Bodansky's "procedures considered to be fair." Perceptions of justified authority also arise from commitment to the underlying normative regime. When an international actor believes a court
interprets and applies the law consistent with its own view of what
the law is or should be, it is more likely to perceive the court as
possessing justified authority. Moral legitimacy or the idea that
"legitimacy is a function of moral justifiability"68 comes into play
when an international actor views an international adjudicative
body as legitimate only if its outcomes are morally justified. Finally,
transparency and other democratic institutional norms influence
perceptions of justified authority. In the absence of these factors,
international actors are less likely to perceive a tribunal as legiti66. Bodansky, supra note 7, at 600-01, 612. He also analyzes democracy, public participation, and expertise as alternative bases for legitimacy in international environmental law.
See id. at 612-23.
67. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM.]. INT'L L. 1,9 (1959); accordJohn Norton Moore, Prolegomenon to theJumprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REv. 662,666 (1968)
(" 'Authority' is used to signifY community expectations about how decisions should be
made and about which established community decision-makers should make them. Decisions made in conformance with community expectations about proper decision and
proper decision-makers, as distinguished from decisions based on mere naked power, are
said to be authoritative.").
68. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1796; accord Koskenniemi, supra note 34, at 175, 178 (proposing that legitimacy must take account of "available notions of authentic human justice"). But see FRANCK, supra note 6, at 208-09 (arguing that justice should not be a basis for
legitimacy in the international context because 'Justice can only be said to be done to
persons, not to such collective entities as states" and because "the concepts of justice and
legitimacy are related but conceptually distinct").
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mate. These three factors are defined and described in Part III,
taking into account contributors to each source, causal links
between them, and where present, "feedback loops" between legitimacy and each factor. Figure 1 depicts a general overview. 69
An international court is legitimate when its authority is perceived as justified. This Article moves beyond the traditional legal
legitimacy approach and acknowledges the multifarious and
dynamic nature of legitimacy in the context of international adjudication. Although this approach is most similar to Weber and
Franck's sociological legitimacy theories, it focuses on why states
grant (continuing) consent to adjudication in international courts,
rather than what compels compliance with law. The approach
taken here also considers what role morality may play within sociological legitimacy. In accordance with this theoretical framework,
Part III discusses and describes the unique factors influencing legitimacy for international adjudicative bodies.
III.

LEGITIMAcy-INFLUENCING FACTORS

The three legitimacy-influencing factors identified are deduced
or drawn from state practice as embodied in treaty provisions giving rise to or regulating international tribunals-what states actually require before consenting to a court's jurisdiction-as well as
legal and political-science literature on legitimacy, and logic. By
"what states require," and "state preferences" or "beliefs," this Article refers to the preferences of actors who influence or set state
policy. Insights concerning state practice are drawn from a survey
of six international adjudicative bodies that vary based on a number of factors, including whether they are regional or global, subject specific (for example, human rights court or trade court, as
opposed to "general" jurisdiction), and whether they are comprised of permanent courts or a series of ad hoc arbitral panels.
The courts surveyed are the European Court ofJustice (ECJ),70 the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
the International Court ofJustice (ICJ), the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (lTLOS), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
69. See infra Part V fig. l.
70. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the only court surveyed which may also
hear cases not directly involving at least one state. EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 230. Like
the other international adjudicative bodies listed, however, its establishment required the
assent of a group of states.
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Body (WTO DSB). 71 This diversity of courts and tribunals was chosen to attempt to discern whether some core set of legitimacyenhancing provisions is present across all of them and to consider
how they might differ from each other. It is important to note that
it is not the purpose of this Article to provide empirical support for
hypotheses about legitimacy-influencing factors, but rather to propose a theoretical framework for thinking about legitimacy for
future debate and empirical testing.
A.

Fair and Unbiased Nature

Parties must perceive a tribunal as fair and unbiased before they
will agree to submit their disputes to it. It is difficult to imagine a
circumstance in which a state (that is, those who shape or influence state policy) or other litigant would freely consent to adjudication by a tribunal it considers inherently biased. Consenting to
adjudication would potentially subject a disfavored party to adverse
rulings, reproach from the international community for violating
international law, sanctions in tribunals where they are available,
litigation costs, and political reprieves at home. 72 Even parties who
might consider themselves institutionally favored likely share an
interest in unbiased tribunals because in the long-run, disfavored
parties may prefer opting out of the dispute resolution mechanism
rather than expose themselves repeatedly to rulings that they violated international law.
A review of the constitutive treaties and rules of procedure of a
number of international tribunals strongly suggests that international actors are unlikely to view a tribunal as legitimate unless it
contains a core set of provisions guaranteeing (1) fair process; (2)
impartial, competent, and independent individual adjudicators;
71. My sUIVey is limited to the European Court ofJustice's Statute and Rules of Procedure, and not the other courts in the European system, such as the Court of First Instance.
Similarly, I look at the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules, but not the Conciliation or Additional Facility Rules which may also be used in the ICSID framework. I
examine the Statute and Rules of Procedure applicable to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, not Annex VII or other dispute resolution mechanisms mentioned in
UNCLOS. I look at the "VTO's Panels and Appellate Body (Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Working Procedures for Panels and
Working Procedures for the Appellate Body). I, too, examine the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights' Statute and Rules of Procedure. Finally, with regard to the PCA, I
examined the Optional Rules applicable in State-ta-State arbitrations only. The sUIVey and
all tables were complete as of May 2008. Any amendments that may have been made subsequently to the statutes or rules are not included.
72. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 (2002) (arguing that when a state
loses a case, its reputation is hurt among other states and its counterparty).
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(3) impartial and independent benches and panels; and (4) unbiased secretariats and registries. 73 These provisions may serve as
"[c]ues" that "validate symbolically" a tribunal.7 4 "Cues" with "historic, social, political or metaphysical reality ... reinforce the perception that ... a rule [or institution] is entitled to respect because
its pedigree has been certified by those whose own pedigree is itself
established, and in accordance with the requisite procedures and
standards."75 In the language of the New Haven School, this set of
provisions about process and decision makers may comprise part of
"the structure of expectation"76 that underpins authority. A body's
legitimacy may diminish if international actors perceive bias in outcome-one class of litigants wins more often than another class of
litigants where that class is or should be legally irrelevant. Transparency, which is discussed in depth in Part III.C, plays an important role in allowing international actors to assess whether courts
are implementing rules in a fair and unbiased manner. 77
1.

Procedural Fairness

An actor who influences or shapes state preferences is unlikely to
view a tribunal as legitimate unless all parties to the litigation have
an equal opportunity to present their views on both procedure and
merits. As Table 1 demonstrates, provisions guaranteeing equal
rights to parties to present their views, both in writing and orally, as
well as equal access to written pleadings and annexed documents,
are omnipresent across tribunals. 78 For example, parties must typically transmit all of their pleadings to the other party, usually
through the registrar or secretariat. 79 If the claimant writes one
73. This is consistent with United States domestic legal theoretical approaches to
legitimacy. Susan Sturm asserts that " [w]idely accepted norms" of legitimate judicial process include participation, impartiality, reasoned decision-making, and efficacy, particularly with respect to determinations of liability or traditional court functions. Susan P.
Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 CEO. LJ. 1355, 1379-80 (1991); see also
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 382 (1978) (positing that the integrity of adjudication-without distinguishing between domestic and international contexts-must be judged by whether "the meaning of the affected party's
participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned arguments" is "adversely affected").
74. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 134.
75. [d.
76. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 67, at 9; see also Moore, supra note 67, at 666.
77. See infra Parts III.A.4, III.C.
78. See infra Part V tbl. 1.
79. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43; Protocol on the Statute of the Court of
Justice art. 20,2002 OJ. (C 325) 167 [hereinafter ECJ Statute]; DSU, supra note 28, arts.
12(6),18; Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA], Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes
Between Two States art. 15(3), Oct. 20, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 572 (1993) [hereinafter PCA
Optional Rules]; Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS], Rules of the Tribunal art.
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brief, the respondent writes one brief.80 If a second round of
pleadings occurs, both parties will have an opportunity to present
their views in writing. 81 The same rules apply to all parties with
regard to oral procedures, handling of witnesses and experts, and
submission of documents. 82
The extent to which tribunals prize efficiency over flexibility in
deadlines and the litigants' role in shaping procedure varies
greatly. While some tribunals have explicit deadlines and mandates to meet them, others have none. For example, the IC] has
no explicit time limits for pleadings submissions or rendering decisions, only very weak language against unjustified delay if parties
agree on a schedule, and a mandate that the Court make deadlines
"as short as the character of the case permits."83 Despite the hortatory language, generous deadlines set in ICJ cases have led to criticism of the Court's fairness and efficiency where cases drag on for

66, Oct. 27, 1997, available at http://www.itlos.org/documents_publications/documents/
rules_en. pdf [hereinafter ITLOS Rules].
80. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43(2); ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note
27, r. 31, at 114-15; ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 20; PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79,
arts. 18-19 (claimant files a statement of claim; respondent files a statement of defence);
ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, arts. 44(2), 60-61; DSU, supra note 28, art. 12(6).
81. In the ICJ, the order of pleadings on the merits is Memorial, Counter-Memorial,
Reply, and Rejoinder, when two rounds of pleadings are deemed necessary. Rules of the
Court art. 45, 2007 I.C]. Acts & Docs. 91 [hereinafter ICJ Rules]. In the ECJ, when an
applicant to the Court files an application, the defendant has the opportunity to lodge a
written "defence," which may be supplemented by the applicant's reply, and the defendant's rejoinder. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
arts. 39-41, 1991 0]. (L 176) 7, as amended and corrected [hereinafter ECJ Rules]. A PCA
Arbitral Tribunal will determine whatever further written submissions shall be required or
may be presented, but "each party [must be] given a full opportunity of presenting its
case." PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, arts. 15(1), 22. Written proceedings in ITLOS
consist of memorials, counter-memorials, "and, if the Tribunal so authorizes, replies and
rejoinders .... " ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 44(2).
82. See, e.g., ICJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 57, 63 (providing that both sides must produce the witnesses' names and relevant information before oral hearings and that each
party may call witnesses from the compiled list); PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 25
(requiring parties to provide names and relevant information concerning witnesses);
ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, arts. 69-88 (setting forth rules on oral proceedings, production of documents, witnesses, and experts).
83. See ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 43(3) ("within the time fixed by the Court"); ICJ
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 44, 48. The ITLOS Statute provides similar flexibility for its
Tribunal to decide the timing of the proceedings. See Statute of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea art. 27, Dec. 10, 1982, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Annex VI, 1833 U.N.T.S. 176 [hereinafter ITLOS Statute] ("The Tribunal shall make
orders for the conduct of the case, decide the form and time in which each party must
conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of
evidence.") .
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years. 84 But deadline flexibility may afford litigants an increased
ability to respond to political circumstances and reach a negotiated
solution.
Other tribunals have explicit statutory deadlines, or seek to limit
delays and maximize efficiency.85 The WTO makes clear that precise deadlines should be set for filing written pleadings that "parties should respect."86 It also sets explicit time limits for a panel to
conclude its work.B7 The WTO Appellate Body permits extension
of deadlines only "[iJ n exceptional circumstances, where strict
adherence to a time-period ... would result in a manifest unfairness."88 The ICSID Arbitration Rules also contain explicit deadlines for appointing arbitrators and issuing awards. 89 The IACHR
sets "non-renewable" time limits for respondents and alleged victims' next of kin or representatives to present pleadings, motions,
and evidence to the Court.90 The ECj, too, contains explicit deadlines for some pleadings, although it allows extensions upon "reasoned application" and permits the President to fix time limits for
other pleadings. 91 ITLOS specifies that proceedings are to be conducted "without unnecessary delay or expense,"92 and like the ICj,
"time-limits shall be as short as the character of the case permits."93
84. See, e.g., Sienho Vee, Notes on the International Court ofJustice (Part 2): Reform Proposals Regarding the International Court ofJustice-A Preliminary Report for the International Law
Association Study Group on United Nations Reform, 8 CHINESE]' INT'L L. 181, 186 (2009) (noting that the "perceived excessive length of time it took for the Court to complete a case"
motivated recent efforts by the Court to streamline procedure and increase the pace of
decision making).
85. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 28, art. 12(2) ("Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the
panel process.").
86. Id. art. 12(5).
87. See id. art. 12(8)-(9). From the date of composition of a panel to a final report,
the time should not exceed nine months unless specific circumstances apply. Id. art.
12(9).
88. World Trade Organization [WTO], Working Proceduresfor Appellate Review,' 16(2),
WT/ AB/WP/5 Qan. 4, 2005), availablR at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
ab_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Working Procedures].
89. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 2, at 104 (putting forth the procedure
for constituting a tribunal in the absence of previous agreement, and containing explicit
deadlines), r. 46, at 121 ("The award (including any individual or dissenting opinion) shall
be drawn up and signed within 120 days after closure of the proceeding. The Tribunal
may, however, extend this period by a further 60 days if it would otheIWise be unable to
draw up the award."). Nonetheless, there are no explicit deadlines for filing pleadings. See
id. r. 31, at 114 ("filed within time limits set by the Tribunal").
90. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights arts. 40, 41
availablR at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm [hereinafter IACHR Rules].
91. ECJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 40-41.
92. ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 49.
93. Id. art. 46.
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It adds, though, that the maximum time for filing a pleading is six
months, extendable only by "adequate justification."94 The PCA's
Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States contain explicit time limits for selecting arbitrators and maximum time
limits of 90 days ~or filing written submissions, unless "an extension
is justified."95 Although most tribunals permit some extensions,
usually for good cause, an emphasis on efficiency exists that is
absent from the statutes and rules of others.
The extent to which tribunals allow parties to shape the proceedings also varies greatly. While some statutes and rules of procedure
allow litigants to set the rules for particular adjudications, others
assign the tribunal a much more active role in determining their
form. For example, parties to litigation before ITLOS and the IC]
may jointly propose changes to the rules of procedure, but these
changes must be ruled upon by the Tribunal or Court. 96 The
ICSID Convention, on the other hand, requires arbitral panels to
apply the agreement between the parties on procedural matters,
unless otherwise provided in the Convention for the Administrative
and Financial Regulations. 97 Similarly, the PCA's Optional Rules
for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States specify that disputes
"shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such
modification as the parties may agree in writing."98

Despite variations among tribunals, the omnipresence of provisions granting equal procedural rights aimed at placing litigants on
an equal playing field suggests that those who influence and shape
state policy are unlikely to consent to adjudication in their
absence. How these provisions are implemented and interpreted
over time, however, may impact willingness to utilize a tribunal in
the future. If international actors perceive that a court is implementing a rule arbitrarily or in a biased manner, both the rule and

94. [d. art. 59.
95. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, arts. 6-8, 11 (imposing time limits on selecting
and challenging arbitrators); id. art. 23 ("The periods of time fixed by the arbitral tribunal
for the communication of written statements (including the statement of claim and statement of defence) should not exceed ninety days. However, the arbitral tribunal may set
longer time limits, if it concludes that an extension is justified.").
96. ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 48; ICJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 101 (stating that
the Court may apply changes to the Rules of Court jointly proposed "if the Court or the
chamber considers them appropriate in the circumstances of the case," excluding rules
concerning the giving and form of judgments).
97. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 20(2), at 111.
98. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 1.
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the institution implementing it may lose force. 99 The consistent
application of procedural and substantive rules influences legitimacy.IOO Because many tribunals are not required to publish their
reasoning on procedural decisions,lol it may be difficult for states
and other constituencies to assess whether procedural decisions
are made in an unbiased and nonarbitrary manner.
While legal theorists prize procedural fairness, some political-science studies of domestic and international courts question whether
perceptions of procedural fairness affect the mass public's opinion
of a body's legitimacy, defined either as the likelihood of compliance with or acceptance of an unpopular judicial decision or general support for a judicial institution. The mass public's (lack of)
concern about procedural fairness is relevant because it shapes the
views of those who set state policy. At least in the U.S. domestic
context, the hypothesis that perceived procedural fairness induces
compliance with unpopular legislative or judicial decisions "does
not fare particularly well."102 In the same vein, a 1992 mass-public
survey of E.U. residents found that perceptions of procedural justice "are of no consequence for acceptance of' an Eel decision. 103
Nonetheless, U.S. "opinion leaders"-individuals who self-report
99. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 147-48. Franck refers to the idea of consistent application of rules as "coherence," a quality which will affect the "compliance pull" of rules. Id.
Specifically, "[ cl oherence legitimates a rule, principle, or implementing institution
because it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to
1) its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to solve similar problems,
and 3) a lattice of principles in use to resolve different problems." /d.
100. For a discussion of how the consistent application of substantive rules influences
legitimacy, see infra Part I1I.B.2.
10l. See ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 48 ("The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its
arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence."). Neither
the Statute nor the Rules require these procedural orders to be published, unlike judgments, which must be read in open court and produced in a written form accessible to the
public. See id. art. 58; ICJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 21,94-95. Consequently, the ICJ issues
orders on evidentiary and procedural issues which might be instructive for members of the
bar of the ICJ and the public, but are not available for review. Similarly, the ITLOS Rules
empower the President of the Tribunal to make some procedural decisions, such as setting
time limits and deciding on extensions, but they contain no explicit requirement for publishing these procedural decisions or their reasoning. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art.
59(3) (empowering the President of the Tribunal to set time limits and decide on
extensions) .
102. Gibson, supra note 5, at 49l. In this study, Gibson examined whether perceived
procedural fairness affected the likelihood of compliance with politically unpopular decisions of the United States Supreme Court. He found no correlation. See id.
103. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 468, 477. Gibson and Caldeira define "acceptance" as "countenance [of] a judicial decision on an important issue of public policy as
definitive, and ... desist[ingl opposition on the issue and refrain [ingl from attacking the
institution for its actions." Id. at 465.
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that they are frequently asked their opinions, attempt to persuade
others how to vote, and are attentive to the U.S. Supreme Court"are more likely to report a willingness to comply with an unpopular institutional decision" the more they perceive it as fairly
made. 104 Other studies suggest that "when conflict resolution is
believed to be impartial and objective, judicial authority is
accorded substantiallegitimacy."lo5 Perceptions of procedural fairness also have been found to relate to "diffuse support" for an institution. 106 Tom Tyler found that "[i]n the legal arena citizens will
be seen as reacting to the procedures through which court decisions are made, as well as to the decisions themselves," and that
"procedural justice" is more important to legitimacy than previously thought. 107
Unless those who influence and set state policy believe a tribunal
is fair and unbiased, a state is unlikely to grant continuing consent
to adjudication or to perceive it as possessing justified authority.
One element that may influence perceptions of a tribunal's legitimacy is whether it provides litigants with equal opportunities to be
heard on both procedural and substantive matters. In some
instances, states seem to prefer flexibility-even the ability to shape
rules once they are before the Court-over efficiency in the rules.
No matter how stringent a body's procedural rules might be, however, if the public or international actors perceive them to be
applied in an inconsistent or biased manner, the tribunal itself may
lose legitimacy.
2.

Unbiased Adjudicators, Benches, and Panels

Just as states require fair and unbiased procedures to consent to
adjudication, they seek to ensure controversies will be decided by
fair and unbiased individual adjudicators and panels or benches of
adjudicators. If international actors consider decision makers to
be unfair or biased, they will perceive the judicial institution as
lacking justified authority. As Edith Brown Weiss puts forth with
regard to the ICJ, "[s]tates will be willing to submit disputes ...
only if they are confident that their grievances will be heard by a
Court which acts independently and treats all states parties to a
104. Gibson, supra note 5, at 489-9l.
105. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 467 (quoting Mary L. Volcansek,Judges, Courts
and Policy-Making in Western Europe, W. EUR. POL., July 1992, at 1).
106. [d. at 484.
107. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 162-63 (1990).
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dispute equally."108 States require both independence and impartiality of individual adjudicators, benches, and panels.
Legal scholars have identified a number of factors relevant to the
bias of individual adjudicators and courts that affect legitimacy.
For example, Brown Weiss categorizes concerns about independence and impartiality of the IC] into four classes: the degree to
which individual judges are responsive to the interests of their
home state,109 the selection process for judges and their qualifications, the extent to which judges align themselves into blocs to the
detriment of parties to a dispute before the court, and procedural
fairness toward state parties. 110 Former IC] President Rosalyn Higgins focuses on personal qualities of judges, tenure, length of term,
confidentiality of deliberations, and transparency of nominating
procedures. III Higgins asserts that "independence of mind" is
"guaranteed by strength of personal character, and supported by
the judicial job being an end-of-career assignment, by having a real
life outside the law, by security of tenure during the term of
appointment, by strong leadership within a court, and by maintenance of the confidentiality of deliberations."1l2 She also believes
that nomination procedures should be more transparent for many
national groups and that a single term of twelve years would
improve judicial independence.l I3
Other scholars focus on factors such as whether adjudicators are
chosen at the time a dispute arises on an ad hoc basis or have a set
period of tenure. For example, Eric Posner and John Yoo suggest
that dispute resolution mechanisms where parties to litigation
choose their adjudicators, as opposed to permanent courts in
which adjudicators are chosen by a community of states before a
108. Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123, 124 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
ed., 1987).
109. Eric A. Posner and Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, too, have looked at the voting
patterns of judges on the ICJ to determine whether judges vote in favor of the interests of
their home state in assessing whether the ICJ is biased. See Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de
Figueiredo, Is the International Court ofJustice Biased?, 34]. LEGAL STUD. 599, 60()'()2 (2005);
see also Eric A. Posner, The International Court ofJustice: Voting and Usage Statistics, 99 AM.
SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 130, 130-32 (2005). For a critique of Posner and Figueiredo's methodology and results, see Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 135, 135-37
(2005).
110. Weiss, supra note 108, at 124.
111. See Higgins, supra note 109, at 138.
112. Id.
113. [d.
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specific dispute arises, are ultimately more "effective."114 They
argue that independent tribunals impose rules and constraints on
sovereignty, thereby reducing compliance, usage, and success of
the treaty regime,ll5 Nonetheless, because states have either
joined or created tribunals with increasing independence in growing numbers, they appear to prefer independence over dependence. 1l6 As demonstrated by the treaties discussed below, even
treaties giving rise to ad hoc tribunals contain provisions seeking to
ensure a high degree of impartiality and judicial independence.
Prizing impartiality does not mean that states want judges to ignore
the political context of a dispute; rather, states are more likely to
authorize a tribunal to decide a dispute when "decisionmaking [is]
premised (at least formally) on principle rather than power." 11 7
Still others suggest that selection processes emphasizing political
balance on a court-such as reflecting the composition of the
Security Council on the ICJ-rather than judicial demeanor, may
undermine the perception of a court as "a judicial rather than a

114. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2005). Contra Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States
Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899, 901
(2005). Eric Posner and John Yoo suggest that judicial independence, more likely found
in courts with permanent secretariats and tenured judges, as opposed to ad hoc arbitration, will undermine effectiveness. See Posner & Yoo, supra, at 27-28. They measure "effectiveness" as an amalgamation of compliance, usage, and success of the treaty regime, but
they acknowledge this approach has serious measurement difficulties. Id. at 28-29.
115. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 114, at 72-74; see also Caron, supra note 10, at 404
(noting that judges in a community-originated institution may consider themselves to be
working for the community, and not the parties to the litigation, while judges in a partyoriginated institution may perceive themselves as working for the parties alone).
116. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 114, at 902-04, 914. As Helfer and Slaughter
demonstrate, Posner and Yoo's hypothesis suffers from methodological and definitional
difficulties, and more important, state behavior in prizing judicial independence by creating or joining independent courts refutes the Posner and Yoo hypothesis. See id. "The
proliferation of courts that share these formal [independent] characteristics strongly suggests, however, a growing global consensus that adjudicatory bodies outside the nation
state should be independent." /d. at 914. "[A] thorough empirical survey reveals that
states are doing precisely what Posner and Yoo argue they have no rational interest in
doing: setting up more independent tribunals and quasi-judicial review bodies and using
them more frequently." Id. at 903.
117. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 314. While Helfer and Slaughter look at
whether neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests enhances a tribunal's "effectiveness," see generally id., this Article examines whether they enhance a tribunal's legitimacy-that is, whether a state is more or less likely to authorize a tribunal to
decide a dispute if they perceive the decision makers as impartial or influenced by international power dynamics.

132

The Geo. Wash. Int'} L. Rev.

[Vol. 41

political body."118 Monroe Leigh and Stephen Ramsey argue that
electing judges on the same agenda and at the same time as members of other U.N. organizations, candidates "pressing-the-flesh" at
the General Assembly, and the frequency of elections tend to
"increase the political pressure on the judges and decrease the perception of judicial decisions made without political motives. "119
The practice of states, as demonstrated by constitutive treaties
and rules of procedure of various dispute resolution mechanisms,
shows a number of options for guaranteeing individual impartiality
and independence, as well as for creating a balanced tribunal. The
impact of these choices on perceptions of an adjudicative body's
legitimacy is a question for further empirical study.
1.

Individual Adjudicators

Groups of states setting up tribunals and courts differ in their
approaches to ensuring impartiality and independence of individual adjudicators, as demonstrated by Table 2.120 Statutes and rules
of procedure address selection processes, term length, qualifications, content of the adjudicator's oath, obligations to disclose
potential conflicts to parties, grounds for recusal or disqualification, and limitations on activities before and during tenure.
Selection procedures vary based on whether adjudicators are
appointed or elected; whether states only or an appointing authority (such as the U.N. Secretary General, the Chairman of ICSID, or
the WTO DSB) are involved; the extent to which such an
appointing authority is involved; and whether adjudicators are
selected when a dispute is ripe for adjudication or every set period
of years. As discussed above, states' choices with regard to selection procedures (election versus appointment) may increase or
decrease perceptions of bias of individual adjudicators and perceptions of the underlying institution as "political" or 'Judicial" in
nature, likely affecting perceptions of their legitimacy. If an adjudicator is elected by a group of states and knows which states voted
for whom, he or she may be perceived as "owing" something to the
states that chose him or her. On the other hand, the link between
an adjudicator appointed by only one state or litigant may be considered to create even more bias, particularly when that adjudica118.

Monroe Leigh & Stephen D. Ramsey, Confidence in the Court: It Need Not be a
THE INTER.'IATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note
108, at 106, 109.
119. Id. at 109.
120. See infra Part V thl. 2.
"Hollow Chamber, " in
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tor has been appointed by the same litigant several times. Election
for a set term of years or for only a single dispute may also affect
perceptions of bias. A set term of years may increase perceptions
of independence because an adjudicator need not "run for re-election" or reappointment after each case.
Required adjudicator qualifications vary based on whether substantive knowledge of a particular area of law is required, although
statutes and rules of procedure almost uniformly require "high" or
"highest" "moral character" and "integrity" or "independence."121
For example, the IACHR Statute, the ITLOS Statute, and the
ICSID Convention require "recognized competence" in the field of
human rights; law of the sea; and law, commerce, industry, or
finance, with a special emphasis on law, respectively.122 The WTO
contains the most specific requirements with regard to qualifications for panel members, providing the following guidance on who
is "well-qualified":
[G] overnmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel,
served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party
to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Councilor Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or
in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade
law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a
Member. 123

While the link between preventing adjudicator bias and "moral"
qualities is clear (although one wonders how these qualities are
assessed), the link between qualifications and bias requires some
additional comment. High standards for qualifications are important both for giving credibility to the judgments of international
courts, as well as for ensuring judicial independence and fair and
unbiased tribunals. Judges with the right "pedigree" confer legiti121. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 4(1), Oct. 31,
1979, 19 I.L.M. 635 (1980) [hereinafter IACHR Statute] ("highest moral authority"); EC
Treaty, supra note 13, art. 223 ("persons whose independence is beyond doubt"); ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 2 ("independent" and "of high moral character"); ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(1) ("high moral character" and "may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment"); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 2 ("enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity").
122. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 4(1); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 2;
ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(1).
123. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(1). Members of the Appellate Body must be "persons
of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the
subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any
government .... [They] shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the WTO." [d. art. 17(3).
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macyon an institution by providing greater authority to the institution and its rulings because they "link[] rights and duties
reciprocally in a notion of venerable, authenticated status deserving special deference."124 Given the omnipresence of these treaty
provisions, states appear to consider special knowledge, integrity,
and conscientiousness of judges to heighten the authority of the
tribunals themselves. One is hard pressed to find a constitutive
treaty or rules of procedure without these requirements.
Perhaps qualifications also serve as a tool in constraining adjudicators from making overtly biased and unprincipled decisions. A
knowledgeable and well-known judge or arbitrator will be aware of
and engage with prevailing legal understandings, presumably making it more difficult for that person to make a decision based
purely on bias. Particularly where a "global community of law"125
exists, reputational costs may be high for a judge or arbitrator who
strays too far from the normative mainstream or is perceived as
making decisions based on personal proclivities, and such decisions may endanger her and the institution's likelihood of being
called upon to render future decisions. 126 Qualified adjudicators
may be more aware of the "discursive constraints" they are subject
to, and whether and how they are nested in an institutional system
of checks and balances, as well as politics. 127 Further, judges and
arbitrators who are part of a global community of lawyers, judges,
and scholars who may comment on their work are more likely to be
aware of and sensitive to both the political and normative boundaries within which a tribunal operates. 128 Tribunals must publish
124. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 94; accard Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 300-01
(noting that judges with knowledge of domestic law may assist in increasing the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal-as opposed to staffing a tribunal with only international
law experts-to assist in gaining acceptance of particular decisions from national judges).
125. Helfer and Slaughter define a "community of law" as a "community of interests
and ideals shielded by legal language and practice. It is a community in which the participants-both individuals and institutions-understand themselves to be linked through
their participation in, comprehension of, and responsibility for legal discourse." Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 6, at 370.
126. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247,249 (2004); Tom Ginsburg, Bounded
Discretion in InternationalJudicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 633 (2005) (asserting
that international judges' lawmaking discretion is constrained by the preferences of states
and other actors).
127. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 257. He notes that states might screen Appellate
Body candidates to select for "a more restrained interpretive stance," which, in essence,
amounts to an additional qualification. See id. at 274.
128. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 10, at 411-14 (asserting that the structure and operation
of international courts and tribunals can be understood as the result of the interactions of
different groups of actors "within and against the bounded strategic space defined by the
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judgments, dissents, separate opinions, and their reasoning for
qualifications to affect legitimacy in this manner. This legitimacyinfluencing factor also requires a relatively high degree of judicial
candor-adjudicators "should neither omit their reasoning nor
conceal their motives."129
Another mechanism states appear to value in promoting adjudicator independence and impartiality is an oath or solemn declaration made upon taking office. As demonstrated in Table 2, the
obligations, specificity, and form (written, oral, or both) of the
oaths differ across tribunals. 130
While all oaths require "independence," "conscientiousness," or
"honor," only some oaths explicitly require preservation of secrecy
of deliberations or continuing obligations during and after service
as an adjudicator. 13l The IC] and ITLOS oaths do not contain
explicit secrecy of deliberations provisions, although other provisions in their statutes and rules of procedure indicate that deliberations are to be secret. 132 Also, some oaths mention service in an
"individual capacity," as well as independence. For example, ICSID
arbitrators must commit to 'Judge fairly as between the parties,
according to the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruction or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any
source except as provided in [the ICSID Convention] and in the
Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto."133 WTO Panel and
Appellate Body members must declare they have read the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
constitutive instrument establishing the international court or tribunal"); Ginsburg, supra
note 126, at 633 (asserting that independent courts' interpretations of international law
are "constrained by the preferences of states and other actors"); Steinberg, supra note 126
(discussing constraints on "judicial activism" in the WTO and emphasizing the importance
of international legal discourse, politics, and constitutional structure).
129. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory ofJudicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1309
(1995). For additional discussion regarding transparency's impact on legitimacy, see infra
Part III.C.
130. See infra Part V tbI. 2.
131. The ECj, IACHR, and ICSID require the judge or arbitrator to swear orally, in
writing, or both to uphold the secrecy of deliberations or the confidentiality of proceedings. See, e.g., ECj Statute, supra note 79, art. 2; IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 11;
ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 106-07. The ICj and ITLOS do not
explicitly mention confidentiality or secrecy in their oaths as described in their statutes or
rules of procedure.
132. See ICj Statute, supra note 17, art. 54(3) ("The deliberations of the Court shall take
place in private and remain secret."); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 42(1) ("The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private and remain secret. The Tribunal may,
however, at any time decide in respect of its deliberations on other than judicial matters to
publish or allow publication of any part of them.").
133. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 106.
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Disputes and the Rules of Conduct, which require service "in their
individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as
representatives of any organization."134 The IACHR specifies that
judges are "elected in an individual capacity," although this is not
noted in the judicial oath. 135 Oaths and other similar provisions
about independence and impartiality serve as additional legitimacy-conferring cues that "validate symbolically" a tribunal.I 36
Tribunals also differ on obligations to disclose potential conflicts
to parties, grounds for recusal or disqualification, and limitations
on activities before, during, and after tenure. While some courts
require disclosure of potential conflicts to litigating parties, others
require disclosure only to the president of the tribunal. For example, ICSID requires arbitrators to list potential conflicts in a written
declaration prior to the first meeting of the arbitral panel, allowing
the litigants to assess for themselves whether the arbitrator should
be dismissed. 137 The WTO requires Panel and Appellate Body
members to disclose any information "which could give rise to justifiable doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism."138 This information is ultimately forwarded
to the parties to the dispute. 139 The PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States state that a prospective arbitrator is under an obligation to disclose "any circumstances likely to
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality or independence."14o On the other hand, the ECl, ICl, IACHR, and ITLOS
require no disclosure to litigants. Instead, individual judges must
approach the president of the court should they have "some special" or "appropriate" reason for not participating in a case. 141
While grounds for disqualification vary somewhat across tribunals, all appear to allow disqualification for manifest lack of independence or partiality. For example, many tribunals require
disqualification if an adjudicator served as an agent, counsel, advocate or adviser to one of the parties, or on another judicial body or
134. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(9); accord WTO Working Procedures Annex II, supra
note 88, at VI.4(a), annex 3.
135. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 52; accordIACHR Treaty, supra note 121,
art. II.
136. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 134.
137. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 27, r. 6(2), at 107.
138. WTO Working Procedures Annex II, supra note 88, at VI.2, VI.4(a), annex 3.
139. [d. at VI.4(a).
140. PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 9.
141. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18; ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 24; IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 19(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(2).
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commission of enquiry which ruled on the same dispute. 142 The
IACHR extends possible disqualification to instances where judges'
family members "have a direct interest."143 In ICSID, a "manifest
lack" of qualifications or failure to comply with procedures for
appointment can also lead to disqualification. 144
States have chosen different options for limiting the activities of
judges during their tenure. For example, judges may not be permitted to serve in political positions for their home countries during their tenure. 145 Judges on the IACHR may not simultaneously
hold positions in the executive branch of government (with some
limited exceptions), as officials of international organizations, or
"[a] ny others that might prevent the judges from discharging their
duties, or that might affect their independence or impartiality, or
the dignity and prestige of the office."146 ITLOS judges may not
"associate actively with or be financially interested in any of the
operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration for or
exploitation of the resources of the sea or the seabed or other commercial use of the sea or the seabed."147
Requirements for disclosure of potential conflicts, disqualification provisions, and limitations on activities during tenure may profoundly affect the legitimacy of a tribunal. For example, disclosure
of possible conflicts to a tribunal's president alone limits the ability
of the parties to present arguments on possible bias and likely creates an inconsistent standard on the appropriateness of recusal
dependent on the views of each individual adjudicator or president. When and how recusal and disqualification may occur is similarly significant. Nonetheless, as with any other provision, what
statutes or rules of procedure require and what a tribunal's practice is, are different questions. For example, although the ICJ Stat142. See, e.g., IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 19(1); ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art.
17(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(1); ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18.
143. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 19(1).
144. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 57.
145. See, e.g., ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 4 (prohibiting judges from holding politicalor administrative offices or engaging in any occupation unless they obtain an exemption); IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 18(1) (prohibiting judges from serving as
members or high-ranking officials of the executive branch of government, officials of international organizations, any other position which might affect "independence or impartiality, or the dignity and prestige of the office"); ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 16
(prohibiting the exercise of political or administrative functions); ITLOS Statute, supra
note 83, art. 7(1) (forbidding the exercise of "any political or administrative function" and
any active association or financial interest in "any enterprise concerned with the exploration for or exploitation of ... the seabed").
146. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 18(1).
147. ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 7(1).
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ute requires disqualification if a judge was an agent, counsel, or
advocate for one of the parties, individuals who were political
appointees in litigants' previous governments when the facts giving
rise to a dispute took place may still serve as judges ad hoc. 148 The
implementation of these provisions is likely to have a significant
impact on perceptions of adjudicators and institutions as fair, unbiased, and independent. Despite the variation among them, the
omnipresence of provisions aimed at reducing the bias of individual adjudicators strongly suggests they are an important prerequisite to recognizing a tribunal's legitimacy.
n.

Benches and Panels

Not only do states insert provisions into constitutive treaties and
rules of procedure regarding unbiased and independent individual
adjudicators, but also they seek to create a kind of balance on
panels or benches of adjudicators. In some instances, states prefer
that neither litigant be "represented" by a national on the
bench.l 49 In others, provisions specifically affirm the right of
judges of a litigant's nationality to retain their seats or grant litigants the right to appoint a judge ad hoc if no judge of their
nationality is already on the bench or panel.I 50 In the latter case,
states prefer to have the opportunity to cancel out what bias might
exist, rather than attempting to root it out a priori. Alternatively,
states may perceive the adjudicator that they themselves appoint as
an advocate for them who sits on the bench, rather than arguing
before it. Nonetheless, even where national judges retain the right
to hear a case or litigants each choose an arbitrator, the tribunal's
president usually cannot be of the nationality of one of the par148. See Phillipe Couvreur, Article 17, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 337, 349 (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin
Oellers-Frahm eds., 2006).
149. See, e.g., PCA Optional Rules, supra note 79, art. 6(4) ("[TJhe appointing authority
shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an
independent and impartial arbitrator and shall take into account as well the advisability of
appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties."). For
example, individuals whose governments are involved in a WTO dispute may not serve on a
panel unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(3).
150. See, e.g., IC] Statute, supra note 17, art. 31 (3) (allowing a party to choose an ad hoc
judge if no judge of its nationality is on the bench); IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 10
(affirming ajudge's right to hear a case even if the judge is a national of one of the parties,
and permitting a state party to name ajudge ad hoc if the other litigating party has ajudge
of its nationality on the bench or if neither litigating party has a judge of its nationality on
the bench); ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, art. 17(3) (allowing a party to choose an additional member of the Tribunal if no member of the party's nationality is on the bench).
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ties.l 51 The ECj, on the other hand, expressly prohibits using
nationality as a basis for challenging a judge. 152 These different
options for balancing out a panel or bench may affect perceptions
of the dispute settlement mechanism's impartiality, fairness, and
reputation as an adjudicative, as opposed to political, institution.
Table 3 shows the variation across tribunals. 153
States have also made rules and aspirational statements concerning the overall makeup of panels and benches, perhaps in an effort
to guarantee a particular kind of balance and to prevent undue
bias. For example, no two members of ITLOS may be nationals of
the same state, and the Tribunal as a whole must be representative
of the principal legal systems of the world and should enjoy equitable geographical distribution. 154 WTO Panel members "should be
selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members,
a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience."155 If there is a dispute between a developing country and a
developed country, the developing country may request that at
least one panelist come from a developing country.156 In ICSID,
the chairman, when designating persons to serve on panels, "shall
in addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and
of the main forms of economic activity."157 "The majority of arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State
party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a
party to the dispute," unless all the members of the Tribunal have
been appointed by agreement of the parties. 15s No two judges on
151. See, e.g., IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 4(3) (requiring a president who is a
national of a party to a case before the court to relinquish the presidency for that case); IC]
Rules, supra note 81, art. 32(1) (stating that a national of one of the parties before the
court may not sen'e as president for that case); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 16 ("No
Member who is a national of a party in a case, a national of a State member of an international organization which is a party in a case or a national of a sponsoring State of an entity
other than a State which is a party in a case, shall exercise the functions of the presidency
in respect of the case.").
152. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 18 ("A party may not apply for a change in the
composition of the Court or of one of its chambers on the grounds of either the nationality
ofa]udge or the absence from the Court or from the chamber ofa]udge of the nationality
of that party.").
153. See infra Part V tbl. 3.
154. ITLOS Statute, supra note 83, arts. 2-3. Further, "[tlhere shall be no fewer than
three members from each geographical group as established by the General Assembly of
the United Nations." Id. art. 3(2).
155. DSU, supra note 28, art. 8(2).
156. Id. art 8(10).
157. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
158. Id. art. 39.
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the IACHR may share nationality.159 States electing judges to the
IC] should "bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected
should individually possess the qualifications required, but also
that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should
be assured."160
The presence of these kinds of provisions suggests that some
kind of overall representativeness is important to states agreeing to
adjudication in an international tribunal, or at least, that no state
or litigant or one perspective be overrepresented on a bench or
panel. The WTO rule that developing countries are entitled to at
least one panelist from the developing world is particularly interesting. The implication is that if developing countries feel their perspectives are not understood by panelists, it undermines the
authoritativeness of the adjudicative body's decisions. At the same
time, it acknowledges that decisions are being made in a political
context, where some players feel inherently disadvantaged. The
presence or absence of balancing provisions may serve to increase
or undermine the legitimacy of a tribunal, and is worthy of crosstribunal comparison and debate. The kinds of "diversity" parameters states have envisioned thus far may change and evolve in the
future. For example, increased gender diversity on the bench or
panel might increase the legitimacy of international tribunals in
the eyes of some international actors.l 61
Perhaps the most important indicator of persistent bias on a
bench or panel, however, is not the structure of the panel or rules
about nationality, but rather the institution's record. If the adjudicative body always rules in favor of one class of litigants or even of
one litigant, it is likely to be viewed as biased.l 62 For example, if
ICSID always rules in favor of the investor over the sovereign, the
WTO rules in favor of the developed over the developing country,
159. IACHR Statute, supra note 121, art. 4(2).
160. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 9.
161. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613,614-15 (1991) (describing international law as "a thoroughly gendered system" and decrying the dearth of women in the
primary organizational structures of international law); lyiola Solanke, Diversity and Independence in the European Court ofJustice, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 89, 92 (2008/2009) ("A widely
acknowledged legitimacy input for courts lies in the extent to which their composition
reflects those whose lives are affected by their decisions.").
162. See, e.g., Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. 419, 427-29 (2000) (discussing the
debate between Jan Paulsson and M. Sornarajah concerning whether international commercial arbitration was and is inherently biased against southern states).
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or, if during the Cold War the ICJ ruled in favor of the communist
over the capitalist country, the losing class of litigants will question
the authority of the institutions. The perception that the scales are
unjustifiably tipped in one direction undermines the strength of
adjudicative bodies.
Not only are international actors assessing bias likely to look to
win/loss records, but also they will examine the manner in which
benches and panels use and shape legal doctrine. Was the outcome "legally sound," or was it somehow divorced from conventional approaches?163 Did it sound like a tirade, or was it framed in
the prevailing legal discourse? For example, scholars assessing bias
in the wake of Libyan oil arbitrations of the 1970s looked to "doctrines relied upon by the arbitrators to reach their decisions, the
legal validity of the doctrine, and its current state of acceptance
under international law."164
Yet a litigant may continue to authorize a tribunal to decide its
disputes even if its class of litigants loses most of the time, or even
in the face of perceived bias in doctrine if other legitimacy-enhancing factors are present. For example, states may prefer to continue
to subject themselves to liability before international human rights
courts because of the importance they place on human rights
norms. They prefer to compensate a victim or change their laws
because the value of human rights outweighs the costs of participation. Similarly, a state in an investor-state dispute resolution tribunal may prefer to suffer occasional losses because it believes that
staying will make it a more attractive candidate for foreign investment. 165 This idea, which this Article calls "normative buy-in," is
discussed in Part III.B below.

3.

Equal Treatment from Registrars and Secretariats

For the same reasons that states require fair procedural rules
and impartial judges, arbitrators, panels, and benches, states
expect equality and fairness from the secretariats or registries of
courts and tribunals. Like clerks' offices in the domestic context,
secretariats are an extension of the tribunals themselves, and they
play important roles in ensuring that states receive equal treatment
and equal information. When a tribunal's officials are perceived as
163. For discussion on the meaning of "legally sound," see infra Part III.B.
164. Shalakany, supra note 162, at 445.
165. See, e.g., id. at 428 (describing the argument of a Singaporean legal scholar that
"developing countries simply must accept arbitration if they are to attract any long-term
foreign investment").
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arbitrary, biased, incompetent, or unfair, states are less likely to
authorize that tribunal to decide their dispute. This state preference is demonstrated in various treaties giving rise to international
tribunals requiring professional and ethical qualifications, as well
as oaths upon taking office, for registrars and secretariat
officials. 166
4.

Transparency's Role

To ensure that a tribunal is not acting in an unacceptably biased
manner, states established a number of mechanisms to monitor
fairness and promote equal treatment. Specifically, through their
constitutive documents, states and other international actors
demand institutional transparency from international tribunals to
protect themselves against observable bias. 167 Transparency mechanisms may take the form of requiring open hearings and published OpInIOnS in accessible languages, and information
concerning the functioning of the secretariats. 168 As a result,
increased transparency may assist in heightening the legitimacy of
an institution. The importance of transparency for evaluating
whether a tribunal is fair and unbiased, as well as its power as an
166. Registrars are often appointed or elected by members of the court or tribunal to
set terms. See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 12(1), (4) (appointed by court to six-year
term); IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 7 (elected by court for a five-year term); ICJ Rules,
supra note 81, art. 22(1) (elected by court for a seven-year term). Qualifications are often
quite high, and impartiality is mandated. See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, art. 12 (requiring applications for the Registrar position to include age, nationality, university degrees,
knowledge of languages, present and past occupations and experience in judicial and
international fields); ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations, in ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS, AND RULES, supra note 27, at 51, 59 (Regulation 13); ICSID Convention,
supra note 1, art. 10(2) (prohibiting the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General
of ICSID from the exercise of any political function and from any other employment or
occupation except with approval of the Administrative Council); ICJ Rules, supra note 81,
art. 22(3) (requiring nominations for the Registrar position to include information as to
the candidate's age, nationality, present occupation, university qualifications, knowledge of
languages, and previous experience in law, diplomacy, or the work of international organizations). Registrars are often required to swear an oath of loyalty and impartiality as well.
See, e.g., ECJ Rules, supra note 81, arts. 3,12(5) (mandating that ajudge will take an oath to
perform his duties "impartially and conscientiously" and to "preserve the secrecy of the
deliberations of the Court"); IACHR Rules, supra note 90, art. 9(1) (requiring the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to swear "to discharge their duties faithfully, and to respect the
confidential nature of the facts that come to their attention while exercising their nmctions"); ITLOS Rules, supra note 79, art. 34 (requiring the Registrar, Deputy Registrar, and
Assistant Registrar to make a solemn declaration at a meeting of the Tribunal to perform
their duties "in all loyalty, discretion and good conscience and ... faithfully observe all the
provisions of the Statute and of the Rules of the Tribunal").
167. Table 4 describes some of the specific mechanisms that states require to ensure
transparency. See infra tbl. 4 and discussion infra Part lII.C.
168. See infra tbl. 4 and discussion infra Part III.C.
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independent legitimating factor is discussed in depth in Part IIl.C
below.
In sum, states are more likely to grant continuing consent to
adjudication in a particular forum when procedural rules, adjudicators, and secretariats and registries are perceived as fair and
unbiased. Neither side must be viewed as favored with respect to
appointment of individual adjudicators or benches and panels of
adjudicators. A state is likely perceive an institution as biased and
may withdraw its consent to adjudication if one side is perceived to
win all the time unless other legitimacy-increasing factors are present. Transparency also plays an important role in increasing the
perception of tribunals as fair and unbiased in the eyes of international actors.
B.

Buy-in to the Underlying Normative Regime

International actors are unlikely to perceive a tribunal as authorized to decide a dispute if they do not support the underlying normative regime that the tribunal is interpreting and applying. A
"normative regime" is the "law" potentially applicable by a tribunal
to a dispute pertaining to a particular substantive area, such as that
relevant to use and preservation of the seas, human rights, or property rights (in many investor-state cases). These legal rules are usually initially codified in a treaty; for example, upon its entry into
force, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea contained the
law applicable to disputes before ITLOS for states that had ratified
that treaty. Treaty provisions are subject to new interpretations
over time, often in light of states' actions and understandings of
what constitutes binding international law, judicial decisions, the
writings of publicists, and the actions and views of other actors who
influence the sources of international law. Thus, the normative
regime of the Law of the Sea is arguably not the same today as it
was in 1982.
International actors will not perceive a tribunal to possess justified authority if the underlying normative regime lacks "currency."
A normative regime has "currency" for an international actor when
it believes the regime is consistent with its view of what the law is or
should be. The currency of a normative regime may change over
time, growing or shrinking depending on actors' evaluations of the
normative regime'S evolution as compared to their interests and
values. When interests and values diverge, international actors
must decide which is more important to them in assessing a
regime'S currency. Each time a tribunal issues a decision that
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diminishes the currency of a normative regime, international
actors are less likely to submit willingly their disputes to the tribunal or to consider its rulings authoritative, although international
actors' interests and values may themselves be shaped by changes
to the normative regime. (Whether and to what extent a state or
other international actor's preferences and interests are influenced
by the decisions and actions of institutions and vice versa are questions of considerable debate among international relations
scholars. 169 )
Regardless of where one stands on the international relations
debate, at least two factors influence a normative regime's currency
for international actors. First, the normative regime developed
over time must accord with international actors' interests and values. For some actors, the morality of a decision will be the linchpin
of its currency; there is no legitimacy without morality. Second,
the currency of a regime may be influenced by whether the decisions of the tribunal are considered legally sound, or consistent
with commonly accepted principles or discourse of legal decision
making. Although political acceptability (whether based on morality or not) and legal soundness appear at odds with each other,
they are both integral to normative buy-in. Legal soundness prevents a decision from appearing too political because it is
grounded in commonly accepted legal discourse. A failure to
understand or account for interests and values is equally dangerous
to normative buy-in. Again, transparency assists states and other
stakeholders in evaluating developing norms. The factors influencing normative buy-in are discussed in turn below.
1.

Norms in Accordance with Interests and Values

For actors influencing state policy to "buy in" to a normative
regime or for it have currency, they must find that it accords with
their interests and values. If a tribunal makes decisions over time
that run contrary to an international actor's interests and values, its
legitimacy is likely to decline. Also, tribunals risk undermining
their authority to interpret a normative regime by failing to address
international actors' concerns external to the law, or by ignoring
shifting ideological and political winds and moral concerns. But if
actors' interests and values are shaped by evolving norms, decisions
169.

See, e.g., John

J.

Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions,

INT'L

SEC., Winter 1994/95, at 5,7 (contrasting realist and institutionalist international relations

paradigms).
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that would not have been acceptable in the past may become more
so.
If a tribunal consistently makes decisions that do not coincide
with international actors' interests and values, they will likely cease
to perceive the tribunal as possessing justified authority. Imagine
that a treaty sets out a standard by which a decision shall be made
which reflects a political compromise between the parties to the
treaty. A tribunal repeatedly interprets that provision in a manner
inconsistent with that political compromise. As a result, parties
may ultimately reject the tribunal's rulings as failing to accord with
their view of what the law is or should be, undermining their willingness to recur to the adjudicative body at all.
More concretely, suppose that various states decide that the continental shelf should be delimited to achieve an "equitable solution" on the basis of "international law."17o When they ratify the
1982 UNCLOS treaty, they have divergent views of what "equitable"
means or what international law requires; some believe "equitable"
means delimitation by an equidistance line in most or all cases,
while others assert the continental shelf should be delimited by an
alternative method, such as the angle bisector approach. 171 If the
IC] decides that "equitable" always means equidistance, states that
prefer the angle-bisector approach may seek an alternative tribunal
with different jurisprudence on the meaning of "equitable," or they
may prefer a negotiated solution, or even no solution at all. Their
disagreement with the court's rulings may translate into criticism,
diminished will to refer disputes to the court, and perhaps even
attempts to undermine the treaty regime or the tribunal itself.
Another example is the le]'s 1966 judgment in the South West
Mrica cases, which was so disappointing to Mrican and Asian states
that concerns arose they would stop using the courtP2 Even
170. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 83, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S.3.
171. See, e.g., Guyana v. Suriname ~~ 210, 221 (ITLOS 2007), available at http://www.
pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-Suriname%20Award.pdf (describing Guyana's position
in favor of delimitation based on equidistance and Suriname's advocacy for an angle-bisector approach).
172. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAw IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIE'IY 397 (1970).
Falk notes:
[Tlhe disappoinunent caused by the 1966 decision has seriously undermined
confidence in the ICJ to such an extent-especially in the eyes of the Mro-Asian
group-that no opportunity is likely to provide the Court with an opportunity to
signal a revival of jurisprudential progressivism in its operations. To overcome
this ironic situation from inhibiting recourse of the ICJ and to international adjudication in general it is important for observers to appreciate the combination of
improbable circumstances that allowed the judicial conservatives to muster a
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though a prior decision is binding only on the parties to the case in
which the Court rendered the decision,173 the IC] frequently cites
its prior rulings on similar legal issues, and states are likely to consider these in evaluating the normative regime.
The mass public's view of (at least national) tribunals depends to
some extent on their satisfaction with specific policy outcomes over
time. 174 In their study of highest national courts in Europe and the
United States, James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira, and Vanessa Baird
propose that satisfaction with a court's policy outcomes ("specific
support") over time is correlated with support for the institution
itself ("diffuse support"), and this relationship is stronger the
longer the court has been in existence.! 75 In other words, the
more instances of satisfaction with the decisions of a court over
time, the more likely mass publics will support the judicial institution. 176 To the extent that mass publics shape state policy, satisfaction with specific outcomes over time may significantly affect
legitimacy.
How a tribunal handles issues seemingly external to the normative regime may also affect its legitimacy. For example, assume that
states conclude bilateral investment treaties with other states and
agree to binding arbitration with investors at a time when environmental concerns are only beginning to appear on the international
stage. States then sign decades-long concession agreements with
investors for extraction of natural resources, which lack provisions
to protect the environment. In response to domestic and international political pressure following an oil spill in a protected area or
the collapse of a tailings dam into a river, a state decides to expropriate the natural resource or to impose sanctions on the investor.
The investor sues for a violation of the applicable bilateral investment treaty. If domestic constituencies and states perceive that a
tribunal fails to take such concerns into account, the tribunal will
lose favor, and its authority may be undermined. On the other
hand, an investor might find the tribunal to be "activist" or "too
majority in 1966 and the probability that the judicial conservatives will exert a
declining influence in future activities of the IC].

Id.
173. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 59.
174. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 343, 356 (1998). The Gibson, Caldeira & Baird
study focuses on individuals with a threshold level of awareness about their highest
national court. Id. at 347-48.
175. See id. at 356.
176. See id.
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political" if it considers factors found nowhere in the bilateral
investment treaty.
Shifting ideological or political winds may also affect the political
acceptability of decisions, and thereby, the currency of a normative
regime. Again in the context of investor-state disputes, assume that
a corrupt dictatorship signed bilateral investment treaties with
binding arbitration clauses, as well as a number of agreements with
foreign investors containing terms that could easily be construed as
unfavorable to the state (and perhaps favorable to the dictator).
Today, host country nationals believe that the foreign investments
have brought little to no benefit, and they elect a leader to reclaim
their natural resources, or at least, to renegotiate terms of agreements. If a tribunal persistently rules in favor of investors in such
situations, holding that the states are treating foreign investors in a
discriminatory manner or engaging in illegal expropriations, states
and the domestic constituencies they represent will likely begin to
disparage the normative regime. The tribunal's interpretations
will be seen as too constraining on sovereign power exercised on
behalf of the people. Tribunals may be seen as out of touch with
reality on the ground in the litigating state.
A normative regime'S currency may grow over time, even if tribunals make decisions that appear contrary to states' and other international actors' short- or medium-term interests. An actor's
commitment to a particular normative regime may increase if it
perceives benefits to staying a "member of the club" that go beyond
particular doctrinal decisions against it, or if it believes the tribunal's decisions are morally justified. For example, states might
choose to continue to consent to adjudication in human rights
bodies despite adverse decisions because they are committed to
human rights and their sense of justice or morality compels them
to continue to consent to adjudication, or because they want to
preserve the veneer of such a commitment. Similarly, even if states
perceive bias in investment arbitrations, states and other actors
might advocate on behalf of remaining in a dispute settlement
mechanism because they perceive that it is a necessary prerequisite
to attract foreign direct investmentp7 An international relations
theorist of the Constructivist school might assert that decisions of a

177. See, e.g., Shalakany, supra note 162, at 428 (describing the argument of a Singaporean legal scholar that "developing countries simply must accept arbitration if they are
to attract any long-term foreign investment").
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tribunal over time can themselves alter state preferences and
identity.178
Allegiance to the transnational polity associated with the normative regime might also affect normative buy-in. Unlike national
courts, international ones "cannot rely upon the 'presumption of
legitimacy' associated with national institutions."179 For example,
social-science research suggests that if citizens feel like they are a
part of the European Union, they may be more willing to support
the ECJ.l80 If they feel no link whatsoever to the European Union,
however, the ECl's authority is called into question. In their discussions about the WTO, Robert Keohane andJoseph Nye suggest
that one way to strengthen such links is through the use of intermediating politicians with access to both the institutions and
domestic constituencies. 18I

2.

Legally Sound Norms

The perception of a tribunal's decisions as "legally sound" likely
affects the currency of a normative regime and support for the
underlying judicial institution. In deciding disputes, international
judges and arbitrators shape the underlying normative regime.
Even if precedent is generally not formally binding in the international legal system, lawyers and judges refer to previously decided
cases as persuasive authority.I82 Consequently, tribunals' interpretations of a treaty or relevant doctrine impact the kinds of arguments that future litigants make, the standards that are applied to
future disputes, and presumably the behavior of those bound by
the normative regime. If interpretations and rulings lack particular hallmarks, international actors may perceive them as unduly
178. See Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, INT'L SEC., Summer 1995,
at 71, 71-72 (stating that the two basic claims of critical international relations theory,
which includes constructivism, are "that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these
structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim
that opposes rationalism)"); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998) (discussing "norm entrepreneurs"
and the influence of membership in a community on state preferences).
179. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 464.
180. See id. at 464-65 (suggesting that legitimacy of transnational institutions depends
in part on citizen identification with the supranational polity, "which, in the case of the
EU, is only beginning to emerge").
181. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 280.
182. The ICJ Statute's article 38 lays out the sources of international law traditionally
referenced by international courts, including 'judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 38(1) (d).
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political, arbitrary, or biased, rather than authoritative or binding.
To be seen as authoritative, rulings and judgments must both
accord with interests and values and be framed in the predominant
legal discourse. They must utilize a kind of legal reasoning or discourse that is commonly accepted by litigants and members of the
treaties establishing tribunals. For domestiCl or other constituencies, the form of legal discourse is probably less important than
whether the court's decision accords with their interests and
values.
Franck's work on international rule legitimacy provides a useful
delineation of the kinds of reasoning likely to be considered
authoritative in the international context. Although Franck's project examines what draws states to comply with international
rules-his definition of legitimacy-the qualities of the rules he
identifies are applicable to legal reasoning in international court
opinions. Specifically, Franck asserts that a rule's (lack of) "determinacy," "coherence," and "adherence" will affect its legitimacy, or
ability to pull parties to compliance. If a tribunal issues rulings that
lack these characteristics, it may undermine its own credibility.
States are less likely to submit a case to adjudication in a tribunal
that fails to incorporate these elements into its rulings.
Franck states that determinacy "denotes a rule's clarity of meaning," as well as "the extent to which the rule's communicative
power exerts its own dynamic pull toward compliance."183 A legitimate rule distinguishes clearly between prohibited and permitted
conduct,184 or "is open to a process of clarification by an authority
recognized as legitimate by those to whom the rule is
addressed."185 Although tribunals are often faced with preexisting
rules in the form of positive law such as treaties, the extent to
which their decisions clarifY rules may affect their legitimacy. If a
tribunal confuses rather than clarifies identifiable principles governing behavior, its utility will be questioned.
The same applies to consistent application of rules to like situations-what Franck calls "coherence"-as opposed to an idiosyncratic or arbitrary application. 186 Coherence "legitimates a rule,
principle, or implementing institution because it provides a reason183. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 84. Nonetheless, as Franck explains, a rule's clarity is not
necessarily an indicator of its compliance pull, particularly when its clear command produces results "at variance with common sense.» Id. at 68.
184. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at 6l.
186. See id. at 152.
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able connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 1)
its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to
solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in use to
resolve different problems."187 If a court applies the same rule in a
number of different ways, those governed by the rule cannot modify their behavior to accord with the rule. Further, if a court or
series of arbitral panels within one normative regime applies the
same rule to identical situations yet achieves divergent outcomes,
international actors will perceive the dispute resolution mechanism
as arbitrary and ineffective. If litigants get no predictability from
the dispute resolution mechanism, they may prefer to avoid it
altogether.
To protect against inconsistency, states have created appellate
mechanisms for some adjudicative bodies. For example, the
WTO's Appellate Body hears appeals on legal issues from panel
decisions and is composed of adjudicators who serve fixed terms of
four years. 188 ICSID has no such appellate mechanism, and the
system has been criticized for rendering inconsistent decisions. 189
Some have also raised concerns about ICSID litigants attempting to
utilize annulment proceedings as a form of de facto appeal,I90 Further, ad hoc tribunals hear annulment proceedings in the ICSID
system, not adjudicators with a fixed tenure. 191 The EC] serves as a
court of last resort for some kinds of appeals, but it also possesses
exclusive and original jurisdiction over others.192 The ICJ generally acts as a court of first instance for contentious cases, with no
possibility of appeal,I93 In both the IC] and the EC], a party may
seek to revise a judgment, but only in a very limited set of circum187. !d. at 147-48.
188. DSU, supra note 28, art. 17(1)-(2).
189. See Franck, supra note 3, at 1524, 1547-48 (noting that "because legal errors cannot be corrected in ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an accepted
realty [sic] at ICSID" and suggesting a single investment treaty arbitration appellate body
for a number of different arbitral institutions including ICSID); Burke-White & von
Staden, supra note 4, at 314-15 (questioning the viability of ICSID in light of inconsistent
decisions in four cases involving the same facts and legal issue).
190. See Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for ACCUTaq
Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 444, 452-53 (2006) (describing
three "generations" of annulment cases in ICSID and how they addressed the distinction
between annulment and appeal).
191. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 52(3).
192. ECJ Statute, supra note 79, arts. 51, 56. For example, the ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment brought by a member state against the European Parliament or brought by one community institution against another, and it has appellate
jurisdiction over points of law decided by the Court of First Instance. See id.
193. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, arts. 36, 60.
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stances. 194 Litigants in these courts may get only one bite at the
apple, with no corrective mechanism available in case of inconsistent decisions. The existence of another layer of review to prevent
inconsistent decision making or to establish clear rules of law may
affect whether a state authorizes or continues to authorize a particular tribunal or court to hear its disputes.
The extent to which adjudicators link their rulings to an "organized normative hierarchy"195 will also enhance or diminish their
authoritativeness. Franck labels this concept "adherence": the "vertical nexus between a primary rule of obligation . .. and a hierarchy of
secondary rules identifying the sources of rules and establishing
normative standards that define how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied."196 The point is that "a rule is more likely to
obligate if it is made within the framework of an organized normative hierarchy, than if it is merely an ad hoc agreement between
parties in a state of nature."197 Judicial decisions that go beyond
the primary rules of obligation-such as those found in normative
regimes as defined in this Article-and extend to obligations
derived from status or membership in a particular community will
194. The ICJ Statute's article 61 states:
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based
upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor,
which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also
to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due
to negligence.
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court
expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a
character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application
admissible on this ground.
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment
before it admits proceedings in revision.
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the
discovery of the new fact.
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the
date of the judgment.
[d. art. 61. The ECJ Statute's article 44 states:
An application for revision of a judgment may be made to the Court of Justice
only on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, and
which, when the judgment was given, was unknown to the Court and to the party
claiming the revision.
The revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording
the existence of a new fact, recognising that it is of such a character as to lay the
case open to revision and declaring the application admissible on this ground.
No application for revision may be made after the lapse of 10 years from the
date of the judgment.
ECJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 44.
195. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 184.
196. [d.
197. [d.
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exert a stronger compliance pull. 198 International actors will perceive them to be more authoritative.
Another factor states and others may consider in evaluating the
legal soundness of a court or tribunal's decisions is its compliance
record. When litigants comply with a court or tribunal's judgment,
they are announcing to the world that they accept the adjudicative
body's decision. Every time a litigant complies with a court decision, it confers authority on the court or tribunal and on its reasoning or methodology. To what extent such peer pressure affects a
state's decision to continue authorizing a court or tribunal to
decide disputes is a matter for further empirical study.
While legal scholars and litigants may read and analyze opinions
to determine whether a court's decisions are legally sound, mass
publics may be more interested in the outcome of the decisions
themselves. It is unlikely that the man or woman on the street will
sit down and read an entire ICJ opinion to determine whether the
court engaged with the predominant legal discourse. Whether a
court's reasoning is legally sound is relevant, however, to the extent
legal scholars, litigants, or opinion leaders who might influence
mass publics care about it. Again, this is a matter for further
empirical study.199
3.

Transparency's Role

International actors must have access to an adjudicative body's
rulings and reasoning to evaluate and assess the currency of a normative regime. The importance of transparency in this regard is
discussed in Part III.C below.
In sum, the currency of a normative regime is likely to affect
whether international actors perceive the tribunal interpreting it as
possessing justified authority. Currency is influenced both by the
coincidence of the court's decisions with international actors'
interests and values, and by the perceived legal soundness of those
decisions, although the former is likely more important for mass
publics. If adjudicators go too far in favoring particular interests
over legal soundness or vice versa, they may threaten the legitimacy
of the tribunals on which they serve. Transparency is an important
prerequisite for allowing international actors to assess and evaluate
a normative regime's currency.
198. See id. at 190-9l.
199. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 489·91 (asserting that opinion leaders' views of proce·
dural faimess might impact the mass public's support for a judicial institution).
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Transparency and Democratic Norms

Transparency affects the legitimacy of international tribunals
both directly and indirectly. First, transparency is indirectly linked
to legitimacy because it allows interested parties to assess whether a
tribunal is fair and unbiased and to decide whether to continue to
buy in to a tribunal's interpretation and application of a particular
normative regime. Without access to information about a tribunal's functioning and reasoning, no such assessments can occur.
Second, transparency is directly linked to legitimacy because it is a
democratic norm and permits some degree of accountability. The
extent to which an institution is infused with such democratic
norms may affect its legitimacy in the eyes of some interested
parties.
A "transparent" tribunal is one in which interested parties, both
inside and outside the judicial process, can observe its processes
and outcomes. 200 A proceeding is transparent "if it can be seen
through easily, 'just as one can easily see through a clean windOW."'201 The purpose of transparency in this context is to allow
interested parties to evaluate the decision making and functioning
of a tribunal. Transparent tribunals also provide principals with
the ability to assess how well their agents are representing them in
judicial proceedings. Citizens of a state can reach conclusions
about their government's behavior and effectiveness before a tribu200. Transparency is variously defined. See, e.g., JackJ. Coe,Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFrA Leadership, 54 U. RAN. L.
REv. 1339, 1339 ("extent to which the public may be alerted to, gain information about,
and perhaps participate in, proceedings organized to adjudicate an investor's claim"); Jeffrey T. Cook, The Evolution of Investment-State Dispute Resolution in NAFrA and CAFrA: Wild
West to World Order, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1085, noo (2007) ("the full and timely disclosure of
information"); Ann Fiorini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POL'y, Summer 1998, at 50, 50 ("the
opposite of secrecy"); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. RAN. L. REv. 1301, 1306 (2006) ("the ready availability to 'interested parties' of
the rules that regulate an adjudicatory decision-making process"). A state's transparency is
linked to "legal, political, and institutional structures that make information about the
internal characteristics of a government and society available to actors both inside and
outside of the domestic politic system." Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord, The Su1frrising
Logic of Transparency, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 315, 316 (1999). An institution's transparency may
also be defined as "any kind of measure that publicizes information about an institution's
behavior, such as monitoring, reporting, or simply responding to inquiries." Thomas N.
Hale & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Transparency: Possibilities and Limitations, FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Winter 2006, at 153, 153.
201. Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Note, Transparency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental
Principle in International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 579, 583 (2006) (citing William
B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational Development, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 293, 295 (2000)).
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nal. Transparency is traditionally linked to accountability.202
Armed with knowledge gained through transparency, international
actors may shape the behavior of adjudicators and litigants and
work to influence institutions.
A number of different options are available for enhancing the
transparency of tribunals. A transparent tribunal might hold open
hearings with translation into the languages of the litigating parties
and produce minutes of its proceedings for public access in relevant languages. 203 It might make pleadings of pending and past
cases and the names of adjudicators and parties publicly available.
A tribunal might also issue written decisions listing the names of
adjudicators and including explicit reasoning, dissenting, concurring, and separate opinions, vote tallies, and signatures. Table 4
demonstrates the differences between several tribunals with regard
to these various options. 204 Not all tribunals employ the same
approach to transparency. For example, the ECl has no concurring, dissenting, or separate opinions, and its opinions are
unsigned and include no vote tallies. ICl opinions, on the other
hand, contain all of these elements.
Table 4 does not capture some nuances that may be relevant
when assessing a tribunal's transparency. For example, although
tribunals may publish opinions, the information they convey may
vary tremendously. As Mitchel Lasser points out in a comparative
study of the ECj, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the French Cour de
Cassation, ECl opinions are more formulaic and contain less
insight into judicial reasoning than those of the U.S. Supreme
Court. 205 Despite these differences, Lasser argues that the ECl
enhances transparency by publishing Advocate General opinions,
which typically grapple with relevant case law and academic writ202. See, e.g., Hale & Slaughter, supra note 200, at 153; Buys, supra note 14, at 134 ("To
the extent that public international arbitrations are made more transparent, democratic
ideals are enhanced because the public has the opportunity to observe the process and
hold the governments accountable for their actions with respect to the arbitration and for
the result. If the public is dissatisfied with its government's actions, it can express that
dissatisfaction at the ballot box.").
203. The issue of the language of a proceeding may appear insignificant at first glance.
Nonetheless, in cases where the official languages of the court do not include the languages of the litigants, transparency becomes harder to achieve and more costly because of
translation costs.
204. See infra Part V tbl. 4.
205. See MITCHEL DE S. -0. -L'E. LAsSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 16, 21-23 (2004) (describing the ECJ as a
fusion of the French institutional and the American argumentative approaches while not
"going far enough in either direction to solve the problems or to take advantage of the
possibilities of either").
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ings. 206 These Advocate General opinions give the public additional insight into the legal debates infonning judicial opinions,
even if the debates are not always explicitly addressed in the judicial opinions themselves. 207 The close analysis that Lasser does of
the opinions of these three courts is a model for the kind of comparative analysis that will yield more insight into additional transparency-enhancing features.
Transparency is an important indirect legitimacy-influencing factor because it pennits international actors to assess whether a tribunal is treating litigants in a fair and unbiased manner, both in its
processes and decisions. More specifically, transparency allows
domestic constituencies, interested litigating and nonlitigating
states, academics, and other "court watchers" to evaluate the functioning of the adjudicative body, and the behavior and judgments
of adjudicators. Court watchers cannot assess whether a tribunal
and its adjudicators treat the parties fairly and impartially if the
doors to the courtroom are locked. Open hearings allow court
watchers to observe the implementation of procedural rules, such
as how much time each party is given to present its case and
whether both parties are treated with respect by the judicial panel.
Similarly, access to preliminary decisions and judgments, their reasoning, and separate, concurring, and dissenting opinions allows
interested parties to determine whether individual adjudicators or
benches and panels made their decisions based on legally sound
reasoning in the predominant legal discourse, pure bias, or by flipping a coin. Conclusions about a court's processes and decisions
can profoundly affect whether an international actor views a tribunal as authorized to decide disputes.
Neither can interested parties fonn opinions about their own
normative buy-in if judgments and their reasoning are not made
public. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for a state or other
party bound by a normative regime to discern definitively what
legal rules are, or how they may be implemented and applied, if no
explanation accompanies decisions, much less whether they were
made in a legally sound manner. Nor can court watchers grasp the
state of the debate surrounding a legal issue without some indication of what adjudicators considered in their decision making and
of what was controversial. Transparent opinions may influence the
content of a normative regime by affecting the development of
206.
207.

See id. at 16, 20fi.08, 228.
See id. at 236-38.
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legal principles and by leading to consistency in opinions. 208
Although stare decisis does not formally apply, prior opinions on
similar issues are highly persuasive. 209 At a minimum, judges and
arbitrators are forced to grapple with another person or tribunal's
approach to the same problem. Further, the strength or weakness
of the reasoning provided in an opinion may affect its political
acceptability, an important component in maintaining a normative
regime's currency.
Transparency not only influences legitimacy indirectly by
allowing interested parties to come to conclusions about a tribunal's bias and their own normative buy-in, but also, it may have
independent force as a free-standing democratic norm. 210 Keohane and Nye suggest that the legitimacy of the WTO, for example,
is linked to the presence or absence of such norms, including
transparency.211 In their view, a lack of transparency and opportunities to participate undermines legitimacy because the public
"does not trust the honesty and legitimacy of secret proceedings."212 Open hearings show that neither the parties nor the tribunal "has anything to hide."213 Keohane and Nye further assert
that democratic societies habitually demand transparency of institutions "that allocate values profoundly affecting people's lives" by
requiring them to publish results, reasoning, and disagreement,
and the same applies to organizations like the WTO.214
208. See Coe, supra note 200, at 1356-57; Buys, supra note 14, at 136.
209. Buys, supra note 14, at 136.
210. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 281-82 ("[I]n the contemporary world, democratic norms are increasingly applied to international institutions as a test of their legitimacy. If international institutions are to be legitimate, therefore, their practices and the
results of their activities need to meet broadly democratic standards."). But see Daniel C.
Esty, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQuI'IY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 34, at 301,301 (rejecting Keohane and Nye's reliance
on "global popular sovereignty" and instead asserting that "legitimacy of a governing body
in the modern world derives interactively from the degree to which it reflects the will of a
political community ... and the reason or rationality of the outcomes it generates").
211. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 265, 276. Keohane and Nye also discuss the
importance of participation-or opportunities to "make one's views known," as well as the
presence of politicians with ties to both institutions and constituencies. See id. at 277-81;
FIorini, supra note 200, at 52 (suggesting that transparency is spreading throughout the
world, along with democratization and globalization).
212. Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277 (quoting Robert E. Hudec, The New vvro
Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN.]. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 45
(1999)).
213. Coe, supra note 200, at 1361.
214. Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277. But see Robert E. Hudec, Comment, in
EFFICIENCY, EQuI'IY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM,

supra note 34, at 295, 298 (questioning the basis for asking an international "mem-
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Transparency is also linked to legitimacy through the concept of
accountability.215 Transparency allows constituencies of accountable actors, such as adjudicators and litigants, not only to observe
them, but also to attempt to exert some degree of control over
their behavior. For adjudicators, relevant constituencies might
include the litigating parties, nonlitigating parties to the relevant
normative regime, other adjudicators, scholars, lawyers, and the
public at large. For state litigants, relevant constituencies might
include the electorate, political party members, special interest
groups such as NGOs, and the media,216 as well as other members
of the international community including states, parties to relevant
treaties, and international NGOs. Private litigants such as public
companies might be accountable to shareholders and other private
and public actors.
Transparency allows constituencies to shape behavior in at least
two ways. First, the mere knowledge that they are being watched
may affect behavior: "[t]ransparency regulates by deterring actions
that are unlikely to withstand public scrutiny."217 In other words, if
judges and arbitrators know that their opinions will be read and
reviewed, they will think twice before putting pen to paper. The
act of publication makes arbitrators and judges more cautious and
heightens their sensitivity to the environment in which they are acting. Similarly, representatives of domestic constituencies or shareholders will review their own declarations and legal strategies with
a different lens if they know they are being observed. When a hearing is open, litigants have more than just one audience-the tribunal-to please.
Transparency also allows constituencies to shape behavior
because if adjudicators and litigants act in a way that is perceived as
unacceptable or highly undesirable by relevant constituencies, they
may suffer consequences. The consequences themselves may cut
short aberrant adjudicator behavior, and awareness of possible
consequences may shape behavior. For example, if an adjudicator
ber-driven organization" like the WTO to "meet the legitimacy standards of an institution
with powers of governance").
215. See Hale & Slaughter, supra note 200, at 153 (stating that transparency is traditionally linked to accountability); Buys, supra note 14, at 134; Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at
291 ("Whatever form accountability takes, transparency will be crucial to ensure that
accountability is meaningful.").
216. Barry Leon & John Terry, Special Considerations When a State is a Party to International Arbitration, DISP. REsoL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2006, at 69, 72.
217. R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law, 58 INT'L
ORG. 103, 106 (2004).
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fails to engage in legally sound reasoning or widely exceeds the
bounds of political acceptability, the adjudicator may suffer professional reputational damage or may not be chosen to serve as an
arbitrator or judge in the future. 218 Conversely, decisions that
strike the right balance may be rewarded. The idea that judges and
arbitrators are rewarded or punished based on outcome or reasoning appears problematic when juxtaposed with ideals such as judicial independence, moral courage, and impartiality. Yet
international judges and arbitrators, like domestic ones, must
straddle the line between producing politically acceptable opinions
and utilizing legally sound rhetoric. States may decide to limit a
tribunal's funding if they are dissatisfied with outcomes or simply
never use it to decide any disputes. Without these sorts of
restraints on adjudicator and tribunal behavior, both the normative regimes and the tribunals themselves might be endangered.
In addition, transparency allows domestic and other constituencies to hold governments accountable for their actions and
results. 219 The link between holding litigants accountable and
legitimacy may be that for some international actors, the inability
to monitor what their agent is doing taints the entire judicial or
arbitral process. By having access to information about their state's
actions, domestic constituencies can make informed decisions
about the authority or legitimacy they wish to confer on their own
political representatives. Consequently, transparency enhances
democratic ideals. 220
Transparency may also make some international actors less likely
to authorize tribunals to decide their disputes. For example, open
hearings or other measures increasing transparency may be disruptive, costly, or heighten the vulnerability of information litigants
218. See, e.g., Keohane & Nye, supra note 34, at 277 ("[The United States Supreme
Court and the Federal Reserve Board] are held accountable through criticisms by professional networks, such as legal scholars writing in law journals and economists writing scholarly articles and offering opinions in the public media. Without transparency, these means
of accountability would be eviscerated."); Buys, supra note 14, at 137 (arguing that the
publication of arbitral awards will assist future parties in selection of arbitrators for their
disputes); Coe, supra note 200, at 1356 (arguing that publication of awards "exposes the
tribunal's work to scrutiny by the academic and practice communities, supplying a species
of peer review"); Rogers, supra note 200, at 1306 (asserting that "the general aim of transparency is to facilitate monitoring the adjudicator").
219. Cook, supra note 200, at nol.
220. See, e.g., Buys, supra note 14, at 134 ("To the extent that public international arbitrations are made more transparent, democratic ideas are enhanced because the public
has the opportunity to observe the process and hold the governments accountable for their
actions with respect to the arbitration and for the result. If the public is dissatisfied with its
government's actions, it can express that dissatisfaction at the ballot box.").
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may want to keep secret. 221 Providing translations of pleadings,
hearings, and judgments in a number of different languages is
expensive and may lengthen filing times and proceedings. Confidentiality may be preferable when it allows parties to keep damaging allegations out of the public eye and prevents outsiders from
gaining access to confidential government or business information
such as trade secrets. 222 On the other hand, purported principals,
such as domestic constituencies and shareholders, might prefer to
shine light on damaging allegations, and procedures can be
tweaked to protect sensitive information that is not necessary to
ensure accountability.
Complete transparency may occasionally aggravate conflict and
prevent negotiated dispute settlement. Bernard Finel and Kristin
Lord assert that transparency can exacerbate crises "by overwhelming diplomatic signals with the 'noise' of domestic politics and confusing opponents about which domestic voices are authoritative
expressions of state policy."223 Litigants in a transparent tribunal
might be forced to frame their arguments to appease particular
interest groups or powerful domestic constituencies rather than to
arrive at a reasonable solution. If the government was elected by
those constituencies, however, perhaps democratic accountability
obligates the government to frame its arguments in their rhetoric.
Despite some possible drawbacks that are difficult to reconcile
with democratic principles, transparency probably is correlated
positively with legitimacy. Transparency provides international
actors insights about a tribunal's independence and impartiality
and the development of the normative regime the tribunal is
charged with interpreting and applying. Further, transparency
may itself influence the normative regime by requiring adjudicators to grapple with prior decision making on the same or similar
issues, perhaps leading to greater consistency in the law. Finally, as
a democratic norm linked to accountability, transparency may
directly confer legitimacy on an adjudicative body.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When states (or the actors who influence and shape state preferences) submit a dispute or category of disputes to international
adjudication, they choose to forego some amount of their sovereignty in favor of other values. For example, by joining ICSID,
221.
222.
223.

Coe, supra note 200, at 1361-62.
Buys, supra note 14, at 137.
Finel & Lord, supra note 200, at 315.
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states limit their range of options for handling economic crises in
favor of a perception that they are attracting investment. Agreeing
to allow an ITLOS tribunal to undertake a maritime delimitation is
an affirmative choice for peaceful dispute resolution over traditional approaches, such as the use of force. States commit themselves to particular human rights principles by submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, limiting
the policy choices available to governments for handling dissenting
views. So long as these trade-offs are considered worthwhile,
strengthening the legitimacy of international adjudicative bodies is
essential. To that end, and in light of states' increasing recourse to
international adjudicative bodies, this Article seeks to spark discussion about legitimacy.
Specifically, this Article proposes that legitimacy should be
understood as the perception that an international adjudicative
body possesses justified authority, and that this perception may vary
over time and across different international actors who may influence state preferences. The Article further suggests that an international court will be perceived as legitimate if it is (1) fair and
unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with
what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and
infused with democratic norms. By moving beyond legal legitimacy and focusing on what underpins authority, rather than what
pulls toward compliance or a sense of obligation to international
legal rules, this Article hopes to reframe scholarly inquiry about
legitimacy and international courts from a theoretical standpoint
and spur empirical research on the topic. Such research might test
the hypotheses generated in this paper, consider the relationship
between different drivers of legitimacy, and seek to understand the
link between different constituencies' perceptions of legitimacy
and the decisions of a state to consent or not to adjudication in a
tribunal. Both theoretical and empirical scholarship about legitimacy and international courts can make a real difference to institutional reformers and those interested in strengthening the
underlying normative regimes that international courts interpret
and apply.
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be re-elected

Duration of the
legal
proceedings

Panels: Duration
of the legal
proceedings.
The list is
updated at the
discretion of the
Parties.

appointed to
Panel of
Arbitrators, a 6
year renewable
term.

Appellate Body:
4 year term, may
be re-appointed
once.
Qualifications

"independent,"
"of high moral
character, "
"qualifications
... for
appointment to
highest judicial
offices," or
'Jurisconsults of
recognized
competence in
international
law"

"persons whose
independence is
beyond doubt
and who possess
the qualifications
required for
appointment to
the highest
judicial offices in
their respective
countries or who
are jurisconsults
of recognised
competence"

prop

"of high moral
character and
recognized
competence in
the fields of law,
commerce,
industry or
finance, who
may be relied
upon to exercise
independent
judgment.
Competence in
the fIeld of law
shall be of
particular
importance in
the case of
persons on the
Panel of
Arbitrators."

"persons
enjoying the
highest
reputation for
fairness and
integrity and of
recognized
competence in
the field of the
law of the sea"

"independent
and impartial
arbitrator"

Panels: "wellqualified
governmental
and/or nongovernmental
individuals,
including
persons who
have served on
or presented a
case to a panel,
served as a
represen tative of
a Member or of
a contracting
party to GAIT
1947 or as a
representative to
the Councilor
Committee of
any covered
agreement or its
predecessor
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IACHR
as candidates"

ICJ

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

wro

~

agreement, or in
the Secretariat,
taught or
published on
international
trade law or
policy, or setved
as a senior trade
policy official of
a Member,"
"independence,"
"setve in their
individual
capacities and
not as
government
representatives
nor as
representatives
of any
organization. "

<.D
.........

Appellate Body:
"persons of
recognized
authority, with
demonstrated
expertise in law,
international
trade and the
subject matter of
the covered
agreements
generally. They
shall be
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EC]

lACHR

IC]

ITLOS

ICSID

PCA

WTO
unaffiliated with
any government
.... [and] shall
stay abreast of
dispute
settlement
activi ties and
other relevant
activities of the
WTO."

Administered by
the President of
Court, and if
possible, in the
presence of
other judges.
"I swear" - or "I
solemnly
declare" - "that I
shall exercise my
functions as a
judge honorably,
independently
and impartially
and that I shall
keep secret all
deliberations."

Content of
adjudicator's
oath

p

In open court, "I
solemnly declare
that I will
perform my
duties and
exercise my
powers as judge
honourably,
faithfully,
impartially and
conscien tiously."

In open session,
at first public
sitting at which
the Member is
present, oath
that he/she will
exercise powers
"honourably,
faithfully,
impartially and
conscientiously. "

p

p

No oath
provided in the
treaty.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Written
declaration prior
to confirmation
of appointment
stating: '" have
read the
Understanding
on Rules and
Procedures
Governing the
Settlement of
Disputes (DSU)
and the Rules of
Conduct for the
DSU. I
understand my
continuing duty,
while
participating in
the dispute
settlement
mechanism, and
until such time
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ECJ
they have ceased
to hold office, of
certain
appointments or
benefits,"

IACHR

ICJ

ICSID
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as the Dispute
Settlement Body
(DSB) makes a
decision on
adoption of a
report relating
to the
proceeding or
notes its
settlement, to
disclose herewith
and in future
any information
likely to affect
my
independence or
impartiality, or
which could give
rise to justifiable
doubts as to the
integrity and
impartiality of
the dispute
settlement
mechanism; and
to respect my
obligations
regarding the
confidentiality of
dispute
settlement
proceedings,"
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ECJ

IACHR

ICJ

ITLOS

ICSID

PCA

......

WTO

'1

o

questioned by a
party."
Assumes
continuing
obligation to
notify Secretary
General if any
such
relationships or
circumstances
arise.
Obligation to
disclose possible
conflicts to
parties

Grounds for
recusal or
disqualification

No. Must
disclose to the
President.

"For some
special reason"
in Judge's or
President's
opinion.
Difficulties to be
settled by
decision of the

No. Must
disclose to the
President.

y

No. Must
disclose to the
President.

For "some
special reason"
in the Judge's or
President's
opinion.
Disagreements to
be settled by
decision of the

Yes. Must
disclose potential
conflicts in
writing by first
meeting of
tribunal. The
arbitrator is
under a
continuing
obligation to do
so.

q
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No. Must
disclose to the
President.

Matters in which
the member
served previously
as agent, counsel
or advocate or as
member of
national or
international

Yes. Must
disclose to
prospective party
proposing to
select him/her
circumstances
likely to give rise
to justifiable
doubts about
impartiality or
independence.
If appointed or
chosen, he/she
must disclose the
information to
all parties.
"Any arbitrator
may be
challenged if
circumstances
exist that give
rise to justifiable
doubts as to the
arbitrator's

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Yes. Disclosure
form forwarded
to parties
through Chair of
the Dispute
Settlement Body.
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ECJ

IACHR

ICJ

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

wro

Court.
Matters in which
judge has
previously
participated as
"agent or adviser
or has acted for
one of the
parties, or in
which he has
been called
upon to
pronounce as a
member of a
court or
tribunal, of a
commission of
inquiry or in any
other capacity."

previously taken
part as agents,
counselor
advocates, or as
members of a
national or
international
court or an
investigatory
committee, or in
any other
capacity."
Judge may
recuse himself/
herself for "some
other
appropriate

Court.
Matters in which
the judge served
as agent, counsel
or advocate or
on commission
of enquiry for
one of parties,
or in any other
capacity.
Disagreements to
be settled by the
Court.
Party may make
known
circumstances
relevant to
disqualification
to the Presiden t
confidentially, in
writing.

14(1) [see
qualifications
above] or if
ineligible for
appointment
under Section 2,
Ch. IV
[regarding
procedures for
constituting
tribunal].
Arbitrator may
not have
previously acted
as a conciliator
or arbitrator in
any proceeding
for the
settlement of the
dispute.
Decision on
proposal to
disqualifY made
by the other
members of the
Tribunal, or if
no agreement or
only one
arbitrator on
panel, then the
Chairman makes
the decision.
Party proposing
disqualification
must file

court or tribunal
or in any other
capacity.

impartiality or
independence.
A party may
challenge the
arbitrator
appointed by
him/her only for
reasons of which
he/she becomes
aware after the
appointment has
been made."
When the
challenge is
made, the other
party may agree
to the challenge,
or the arbitrator
may choose to
withdraw.
If parties
disagree on the
challenge and
the arbitrator
does not
withdraw, an
appointing
authority is to
resolve the
dispute.

the avoidance of
direct or indirect
conflicts of
interests" and
"impairment" of
the "integrity,
impartiality or
confidentiality of
the dispute
settlement
mechanism."

reason," with

concurrence of
the President. If
the President
disagrees, Court
must decide.
The President
must advise the
Judge if the
President finds
"cause for
disqualification
or for some
other pertinent
reason [he/she]
should not take
part in a given
matter." If

For "some

special reason,"
in the member's
or the
President's
opinion. Doubts
to be resolved by
the Tribunal.
Party may make
known
circumstances
relevant to
disqualification
to President.
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Appellate Body:
"illness or for
other serious
reasons."
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EC]

IACHR
disagreement,
Court decides.

Limitations on
activities during
and after tenure

gn

During tenure,
may not seIVe as
"a. Members or
high-ranking
officials of the
executive branch
of government,
except for those
who hold
positions that do
not place them
under the direct
control of the
executive branch
and those of

IC]

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

WTO

May not act as
May not accept
agent, counselor any instruction
advocate in any
or compensation
case during
with regard to
tenure.
the proceeding
May not seIVe in from any source,
any political or
except as
administrative
provided in the
function, or
ICSID
engage in any
Convention and
other occupation relevant Rules
of a professional and Regulations.
nature.
Any doubts to be
settled bv

-...J

~

proposal with
Secretary
General before
the proceeding
is declared
closed, stating
basis for seeking
the
disqualification.
Secretary
General must
transmit the
proposal to the
other members,
including the
other party.
Arbitrator may
resign with the
consent of the
Tribunal.

....,
~

(b

o
(b

?

~
~

......

:::....

~

None listed.
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Panels and
Appellate Body:
May not "incur
any obligation or
accept any
benefit that
would in anyway
interfere with, or
which could give
rise to, justifiable
doubts as to the
proper
performance of
that person's
dispute
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ECJ
and discretion
"as regards the
acceptance, after
they have ceased
to hold office of
certain
appointments or
benefits."
May not hold
political or
administrative
offices or engage
in any
occupation
(gainful or not)
unless he/she
obtains an
exemption from
the Council.

IACHR

ICJ
decision of the
diplomatic
Court.
agents who are
Practice
not Chiefs of
Directions
Missions to the
OAS or to any of indicate that
Court considers
its member
it not "in the
states;
interest of the
b. Officials of
sound
in ternational
administration of
organizations;
justice" for a
c. Any others
person to sit as a
that might
judge ad hoc
prevent the
who is acting or
judges from
discharging their recently acted as
agent, counsel or
duties, or that
advocate in
might affect
another case
their
independence or before the
Court, within the
impartiality, or
last three years.
the dignity and
prestige of the
office."
Any doubts to be
resolved by the
Court.

ICSID

ITLOS
the resources of
the sea or the
seabed or other
commercial use
of the sea or the
seabed," and
may not act as
advocate,
counselor agent
in any case
before the
Tribunal.
Doubts to be
resolved by the
Tribunal.
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WTO
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ECJ

IACHR

ICJ

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

wro
time use such
infonnation
acquired during
such
deliberations
and proceedings
to gain personal
advantage or
advantage for
others."
Panels: Member
States may "not
give them
instructions nor
seek to influence
them" on
pending matters.
Appellate Body:
May "not
participate in the
consideration of
any disputes that
would create a
direct or indirect
conflict of
interest."
May not accept
employment or
pursue any
professional
activity
inconsistent with
duties and
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responsibilities.
Must exercise
office without
"accepting or
seeking
instructions from
any
international,
government, or
nongovernmental
organization or
any private
source."
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TABLE

Number of
Adjudicators

ECJ
For grand
chamber,
thirteen. Other
chambers of
three and five.
ECJ can sit as
full court under
specific
conditions.

IACHR
Seven.

3:

'f

UNBIASED PANELS AND BENCHES

ICJ
Fifteen.
Chambers of at
least three
members.

Ol

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

wro

Either one or an
odd number
agreed upon by
parties. If there
is no agreement,
three.

Twenty-one.
Chambers of at
least three
members.

If no previous
agreement by
parties, three.
Assume odd
number of
arbitrators.

Unless parties to
the dispute
agree to five
panelists within
ten days of the
establishment of
the panel, three
panelists.
For the
Appellate Body,
seven. On any
one case, three
serve by rotation.

Right to a
National Judge
or a Judge Ad
Hoc

No. A Party may
not apply for a
change in the
composition of
the Court or
chambers on the
grounds of
either nationality
of the Judge or
the absence
from the Court
or chamber of a
Judge of the
nationality of
that Party.

,..,
I

Yes, if the other
Party has a judge
of its nationality
on the bench, or
if nei ther Party
has a judge of its
nationality on
the bench.

Yes, if no judge
of the Party's
nationality is on
bench.

Yes, if the Party
Yes, if no judge
of Party's
appoints its own
arbi trators rather nationality is on
bench.
than using the
appointing
authority. If the
Party uses th e
appointing
authority, the
judges mayor
may not be of
same nationality.

Yes, if the Party
appoints its own
arbitrators rather
than using the
appointing
authority. If the
Party uses the
appointing
authority, the
judges mayor
may not be of
same nationality.
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CJ
(b
o
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I ::r'
Panels: No.
Citizens of
......
Members whose
::i
I
governments are
involved in the
dispute may not
serve on a panel
unless parties to
the dispute
agree otherwise. i
Also, parties may
"not give
[panelists]
instructions nor
seek to influence
them" on
pending matters.
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ECJ

IACHR

ICJ

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

Appellate Body:
No.
Member may
serve as
President/Chair
when the
Ii tigating Party is
of the same
nationality

Requirement or
aspiration for
representation of
particular
constituencies
on the
adjudicative
body

Yes.

One judge per
member state.

No.

No two judges
may be nationals
of the same
state.

No.

Yes, if appointed No.
jointly or by the
appointing
authority.
But see the
aspirations for
representation of
particular
constituencies
below.

Electors to "bear The Chairman,
in mind not only in designating
that the persons
persons to serve
to be elected
on Panels, "shall
should
... pay due
individually
regard to the
possess the
importance of
qualifications
assuring
required, but
represen tation
also that in the
on the Panels of
body as a whole
the principal
the
legal systems of
representation of the world and of
the main forms
the main forms
of civilization
of economic
and of the
activity."
principle legal
Majority of
systems of the
arbitrators shall
world should be
be nationals of
assured."
States other than
No two judges
the Contracting
may be nationals State party to
of the same
the disDute
and
p

No two members
may be nationals
of the same
state.
The tribunal as a
whole must be
representative of
the principle
legal systems of
the world and
should enjoy
equitable
geographic
distribution.
May be no fewer
than three
members from
each
geographical
group as
established by
UNGA.

Yes, if appointed Panels: N/ A.
jointly or by the
Appellate Body:
appointing
Yes.
authority.
But see the
aspirations for
representation of
particular
constituencies
below.
Appointing
authority "shall
have regard to
such
considerations as
are likely to
secure the
appointment of
an independent
and impartial
arbitrator and
shall take into
account the
advisability of
appointing an
arbitrator of a
nationality other
than the
nationalities of
the parties."

I\:)

WTO

Panels: Panels
should be
selected "wi th a
view to ensuring
the
independence of
the members, a
sufficiently
diverse
background and
a wide spectrum
of experience."
If dispute is
between a
developing and a
developed
country, at least
one panelist
must come from
a developing
country if the
developing
country
try so
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ECJ

ICJ
state.
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the Contracting
State whose
national is a
party to the
dispute, unless
the Parties agree
otherwise.
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requests.
Appellate Body:
The Members
should be
"unaffiliated with
any government"
and "broadly
representative of
membership in
-
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TABLE

Pleadings public

Hearings public

Judgments or
Awards or
Recommendations
public
p

4:

o
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TRANSPARENCY

EC]

IACHR

IC]

ICSID

ITLOS

PCA

WTO

Confiden tial at
least until oral
hearings. After
oral hearings,
confidentiality
depends on
whether the
content will
undermine
court
proceedings.

Yes, unless the
Court decides
otherwise.

Only (l) on or
after the
opening of the
oral proceedings
and (2) after
ascertaining the
views of the
parties.

No, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.

Yes, at the time
the oral
proceedings are
initiated, or
earlier, after
ascertaining the
views of the
parties.
Tribunal may
decide to keep
pleadings
confidential
after hearing
the views of the
parties.

No, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Written
submissions are
treated as
confidential, but
parties to a
dispute may
disclose their own
posi tions to the
public.

Yes, unless the
Tribunal
decides
otherwise or the
parties demand
that the public
not be admitted.

No, hearings are
in camera, unless
the parties
agree otherwise.

Yes, unless the
Court, of its
own motion or
upon
application by
the parties,
"decides
otherwise for
serious reasons."
Oral hearings
held in camera
are not public.

Yes, unless the
Court, in
"exceptional
circumstances"
decides
otherwise.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes, unless the
Court decides
otherwise or the
parties demand
that the public
not be admitted.

No, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.
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Panels and
Appellate Body:
No, but the parties
can agree
otherwise.
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Yes.

No, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.

Yes.

No, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Not public until
the DSB adopts
p
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the Findings and
Recommendations.
Judgments or
Awards or
Findings and
Recommendations
must state
reasoning upon
which based

Yes.

Judgments or
Awards or
Findings and
Recommendations
list names of
adjudicators
participating

Yes.

Separate opinions
permitted

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes, unless the
parties agree
otherwise.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Yes.

I

i

I

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Yes.
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Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

If one arbitrator
fails to sign the
award, he/she
must explain
why.

Panels and
Appellate Body:
Yes, but opinions
expressed by
individual
adjudicators are
anonymous.
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